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INTRODUCTION 
When credit law clashes with creative law, neither prevails.  
They undermine each other, and the result is extreme uncertainty.  
Credit law can eviscerate the protections granted by the trinity of 
copyright, trademark, and patent—destroying legal protections and 
incentives for the creation, cultivation, marketing, and distribution 
of artistic works, brand names, marks, and inventions.  Conversely, 
the special protections afforded by copyright, trademark, and pat-
ent can impair the predictability that is so necessary to the opera-
tion of the credit system that finances creative works. 
Although legal protection of rights in intellectual property may 
be a necessary ingredient in the promotion of creativity, it certainly 
is not by itself a sufficient foundation for the creation of intellec-
tual property.1  To the extent that a creator is motivated by profit, 
financing is a prerequisite to the creation and dissemination of in-
tellectual property.2  Because debt, rather than equity investment, 
 
1. Perhaps intellectual property law is not even necessary for the creation of certain 
types of works.  John Milton put it succinctly when he wrote that “[t]ruth and under-
standing are not such wares as to be monopolized and traded in by tickets and statutes 
and standards.”  JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica, in THE OXFORD AUTHORS: JOHN MILTON 
257 (Stephen Orgel & Jonathan Goldberg eds. 1991) (protesting reinstatement of licens-
ing requirement by Parliament before author could publish and distribute works).  Of 
course, if Milton were alive today, he probably would enter into a book contract with a 
New York publishing house and auction off the screen rights to Paradise Lost.  See 
MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS 1-9 (1993) (discussing tension between viewing 
creative works as products of authorial genius or as property which can be owned). 
2. The ability to finance a project is important in all endeavors, not just profit moti-
vated creations.  Certainly, for the cases discussed in this Article, pertaining to the enter-
tainment industry or to trademarks in company names, profit is a primary motivation for 
creation.  But even if the creator is purely altruistic and does not view her creation as an 
investment in the financial sense, the question of finance is still an issue.  For non-profit 
motivated creations, however, government funding or perhaps a system of patronage are 
the only financial means to the creator’s artistic ends.  See generally RICHARD EPSTEIN, 
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is the primary means of financing the creation of many works, the 
law of secured credit can provide additional incentives and disin-
centives for participants in the intellectual property regime.3  Thus 
the law governing credit transactions,4 which includes common 
law contract, article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(“U.C.C.”),5 and the Federal Bankruptcy Code,6 provides crucial 
support to the laws of copyright, trademark, and patent. 
But the law of secured credit7 often conflicts with the law of 
intellectual property,8 as set forth in the Copyright Act9 and the 
Lanham Act.10  Under the current regime, the law of secured credit 
can undermine much of the property right structure, thereby evis-
cerating the incentives provided by the Copyright and Lanham 
 
BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 306-11 (1993) (noting “the long-term structural risk that 
public funding places on the safety of the arts in a political society”). 
3. Due to preemption, there is less conflict between state contract law and federal 
intellectual property laws.  Contracts that purport to limit trademark rights would not be 
enforced because of conflict with the Lanham Act.  See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil 
Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (holding that “states are free to regulate the use of such 
intellectual property in any manner not inconsistent with federal law”).  Similarly, con-
tracts that limit or conflict with rights under the Copyright Act would also be preempted.  
The submitter of an idea “who has elaborated her idea in detailed, concrete form has a 
greater chance of recovery under state law, but she also faces a greater likelihood of pre-
emption under Section 301 [of the Copyright Act],” which preempts state laws covering 
the subject matter of copyright and granting rights equivalent to those under the Copy-
right Act.  PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, AND TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE 
DOCTRINES 768 (1990) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT, PATENT, & TRADEMARK].  Also, it is un-
clear whether the Copyright Act or the Lanham Act preempts article 9.  See discussion 
infra note 89 and accompanying text (describing application of article 9).  Furthermore, 
because the Bankruptcy Code, the Copyright Act, and the Lanham Act are all federal 
law, preemption is not an issue.  To the extent that the Bankruptcy Code conflicts with 
the Copyright Act or the Lanham Act, the resolution of the conflict lies with Congress. 
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 1633 (1994). 
5. U.C.C. § 9 (1995).  The Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) has been adopted 
in some form in every state except Louisiana.  See FRIEDRICH KESSLER, GRANT GILMORE 
& ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 52 (3d ed. 1986). 
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109-1330 (1994). 
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1633. 
8. This Article ignores patent law because such a complex subject warrants separate 
treatment.  Furthermore, because this Article focuses largely on the entertainment, ser-
vice, and information industries, the analysis can be more detailed by concentrating on 
copyright and trademark. 
9. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994). 
10. Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998)). 
GHOSH.TYP 9/29/2006  4:47 PM 
1997] MORPHING OF PROPERTY RULES AND LIABILITY RULES 103 
Acts.  Nevertheless, the use of intellectual property as collateral 
has expanded over the past decade.11  Recent headline-making 
transactions evince the increased use of intellectual property as 
collateral for start-up and financing ventures. 
For example, in 1995, the Hollywood producers Steven Spiel-
berg, Jeffrey Katzenberg, and David Geffen founded DreamWorks, 
SKG, which was funded by a $1 billion loan, secured largely by 
intellectual property holdings of the creators, arranged by Chemi-
cal Bank.12  Similarly, Westinghouse Corporation (“Westing-
house”) financed its $10 billion bid for CBS through a loan se-
cured by Westinghouse’s intellectual property rights.13  Orion 
Pictures Corporation’s experience with bankruptcy proceedings 
indicated the importance of the use of copyrights as collateral.14  
The distribution of several of Orion’s films, including Blue Sky, 
whose female star won an Academy Award for Best Actress in 
1994, was delayed because of attachment by creditors prior to the 
bankruptcy proceeding.15 
 
11. See generally Alice Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: Where Intellectual Prop-
erty and Commercial Law Collide, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1645, 1647 (1996) (“In such situa-
tions, and increasingly as a general matter, lenders have come to appreciate the impor-
tance of intellectual property assets to the companies with which they do business.”).  In 
1984 and 1985 together, the U.C.C. filings of seven creditors listed copyrights, but not 
trademarks or patents, as collateral.  Search of LEXIS, LIENS Library, ALLIEN Data-
base (Mar. 27, 1998) (search for filings containing “1984” or “1985” in DATE field and 
containing “copyright” but not “trademark” or “patent”).  A similar search for the years 
1994 to 1995 uncovered 74 filings.  Search of LEXIS, LIENS Library, ALLIEN Data-
base (Mar. 27, 1998).  For patents, the number of filings increased from 56 in 1984-1985 
to 619 in 1994-1995.  Search of LEXIS, LIENS Library, ALLIEN Database (Mar. 27, 
1998).  The most dramatic increase, however, was in the use of trademarks, which num-
bered 61 in 1984-1985 and more than one thousand in 1994-1995.  Search of LEXIS, 
LIENS Library, ALLIEN Database (Mar. 27, 1998). 
12. See Monica Roman, Unknown Chemical Reaction: Unlike bank merger partner, 
Chase not key player in showbiz finance, HOLLYWOOD REP., Aug. 29, 1995, at 1. 
13. See id. at 6, 177.  Many Internet providers finance their service through bank 
loans collateralized by software.  See Steve Cocheo, Where the ‘Net Goes for Money, 
A.B.A. BANKING J., Apr. 1996, at 40. 
14. See Frank Rose, Cover Story: No Flowers, Send Money, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 
1995, at C8. 
15. See Elliot Forbes & David Pierce, Who owns the movies?, 30 FILM COMMENT 
43 (1994); Stan Soocher, Film industry faces historic crossroads, 7 ENT. L. & FIN. 1 
(1992).  The use of copyrights as collateral was a central problem in the Orion bank-
ruptcy proceedings, in which several banks that had extended lines of credit to Orion 
claimed secured status in twelve of Orion’s films based on a state U.C.C. filing.  The 
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At one level, the issues are simple and analogous to conflicts 
that are at the heart of property and contract.  All property right 
systems teeter between the protection of two sometimes conflicting 
interests: the right of the property right holder to exclude others,16 
and the right of third parties to access the property right.17  Al-
though property rights often are viewed simply from the perspec-
tive of granting exclusion rights, property rights systems often 
place limitations on the right to exclude when the right to access is 
more important. 
The classic case is of the conflict between the harbor owner 
and the ship owner, with the latter wanting to dock his ship in the 
harbor to avoid inclement weather.18  Although the harbor owner 
has the right to exclude the ship owner, the common law granted a 
right of access to ship owners in this situation because of the 
greater necessity of avoiding the loss of the ship.  Even though this 
rule may be viewed as lessening incentives to build harbors, be-
cause of the prospect of opening the harbor to wayward ships the 
rule promotes economic activity by giving ship owners insurance 
against loss in the event of being adrift and in need of moorings.  
Furthermore, the law forces an exchange by requiring the ship 
owner to compensate the harbor owner for any loss to the property 
and for its use. 
The harbor example illustrates the two principal ways in which 
a property rights system protects property rights.  First, a property 
rights system can give the property right holder an absolute right to 
exclude,19 such as the harbor owner would have against trespass-
ers.  The right can be purchased by third parties, but cannot be 
 
banks’ arguments were rejected because of the federal filing requirements under the 
Copyright Act.  See Steven Weinberger, Perfection of Security Interests in Copyrights: 
The Peregrine Effect on the Orion Pictures Plan of Reorganization, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 959, 980-81 (1993) (criticizing federal filing requirements involving Peregrine 
and AEG opinions). 
16. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 746 (1917). 
17. See id. at 746-47. 
18. The facts are a simplification of the classic torts case Vincent v. Lake Erie 
Transportation Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).  See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 55 (dis-
cussing the Vincent case); see also Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auc-
tions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 715-16 (1996). 
19. See Hohfeld, supra note 16, at 746. 
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taken.  Second, a property rights system can limit the property 
owner’s right to exclude by granting third parties a right to “take 
and pay.”20  The latter rule is illustrated by the ship in dire straits 
that needs to use the harbor to avoid a greater calamity.  Although 
the ship owner can gain access to the harbor, the ship owner must 
pay for it.21  The former rule in which the property right must be 
bought is referred to as a “property rule;”22 the latter rule corre-
sponding to take or pay is referred to as a “liability rule.”23 
Our legal system often involves a mix of property and liability 
rules, each designed to protect specific interests in different con-
texts.  Often, as is the case with intellectual property and secured 
credit, the clash in rules arises from the use of property and liabil-
ity rules to protect different rights.  If one examines the ways in 
which the protection of competing interests is expressed in our in-
tellectual property laws, some inherent inconsistencies appear. 
The Copyright Act protects the copyright owners’ right to re-
produce, adapt, publish, perform, and display the protected work.24  
These rights attach as soon as the copyright owner puts the work in 
a tangible medium of expression.25  The principal protection for 
 
20. See Tyler E. Chapman, To Save and Save Not: The Historic Preservation Impli-
cations of the Property Rights Movement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 111 (1997). 
21. See Vincent, 124 N.W. at 222. 
22. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability, and 
Inalienabilty: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105 (1972), for the 
origin of the terms. 
23. See id.  See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Prop-
erty, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655 (1994), for a discussion of property and liability rules in 
the context of intellectual property.  In this context, Paul Goldstein refers to problems 
associated with the right to exclude as “the problem of inappropriability” and problems 
regarding the right to access as “the problem of indivisibility.”  Paul Goldstein, Com-
ments on a Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2573, 2574 (1994) [hereinafter Goldstein I]. 
24. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (defining exclusive rights in copyrighted works). 
25. Id. § 102 (stating that “copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression”).  According to the statutory 
notes, “tangible medium of expression” is independent of the form, manner, or medium 
of fixation and of whether it is capable of perception, directly or by means of any ma-
chine or device “now known or later developed.”  The meaning of tangible medium of 
expression is important for understanding whether computer object codes or codes em-
bedded on Read Only Memory (“ROM”) can receive copyright protection.  See Apple 
Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that 
object codes and codes embedded on ROM are copyrightable). 
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the copyright owner lies in a court’s authority to issue injunctions 
against the infringer and to impose damages for lost profits.  This 
protection corresponds to a property rule.26  In certain cases, how-
ever, a third party can have access to the copyrighted work and pay 
the owner for use.27  For example, cable television operators can 
transmit copyrighted works without the consent of the copyright 
owner, as long as the operator compensates the owner for use.28  
This remedy, referred to as a “compulsory license,”29 is granted for 
four categories of copyrighted works—cable broadcasts, musical 
compositions, public broadcasting, and jukeboxes—and it corre-
sponds to liability rule protection for the copyright owner.30  In 
contrast, the Lanham Act31 provides no compulsory licenses for 
trademarks.  Instead, the Lanham Act provides that the trademark 
owner can obtain an injunction against an infringing use and re-
cover an accounting for profits from third parties.32 
One of the incidents of property ownership is the ability to 
transfer rights voluntarily to other parties.33  Copyrights, and to a 
more limited extent trademarks, can be licensed to third parties 
whose rights in the copyright or trademark are determined solely 
by the terms of the license.34  A licensor of a trademark or copy-
 
26. Section 501 defines the standard for infringement.  17 U.S.C. § 501.  The reme-
dies of injunction and confiscation are provided in sections 502 and 503.  Id. §§ 502, 503.  
The damage remedies are provided in sections 504 and 505.  Id. §§ 504, 505.  Finally, 
criminal penalties are provided for in section 506.  Id. § 506. 
27. See generally id. § 106 (stating copyright holder’s right to authorize use of 
copyrighted material). 
28. See id. § 111 (limitations on exclusive rights; secondary transmissions). 
29. Id. § 115. 
30. See id. §§ 111, 115, 116, 118. 
31. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998). 
32. Owners of trademarks registered with the Patent and Trademark Office 
(“P.T.O.”) have the right to enjoin infringing uses of the mark and collect damages, pos-
sibly trebled, plus costs.  See id. §§ 1114, 1119, 1121.  For owners of marks that are not 
registered, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) provides a corresponding set of remedies under federal un-
fair competition law. 
33. See J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 711 (1996). 
34. Copyright can be transferred by license or other means under section 201(d)(1) 
of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1), which allows the transfer of ownership of 
copyright “by any means of conveyance or by operation of law.”  Id.  A “transfer of 
copyright ownership” is defined as “an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any 
other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive 
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right can protect his rights against a licensee primarily through 
property rules.  If the licensee makes use of the protected work in a 
way that is inconsistent with the license, this use would be the ba-
sis for an infringement action.35  If the licensor breaches, more 
likely than not, the licensee’s rights in the license are protected by 
a liability rule, that is, a suit for damages. 
Just as a copyright or trademark license grants rights to third 
parties, secured credit grants rights in the assets of a debtor to a se-
cured creditor.36  Once a debtor has obtained a loan from a creditor 
secured by collateral, the debtor is free to use the same collateral 
as security for other loans, and to continue using the collateral in 
his business.37  The debtor does not lose the incidents of owner-
 
rights comprised in a copyright.”  Id. § 101. 
Trademarks, however, can be assigned under 15 U.S.C. § 1060, which provides that 
“a registered mark . . . shall be assignable with the goodwill of the business in which the 
mark is used.”  Id.  The Lanham Act is silent about transfers, other than assignments, and 
does not ban or regulate such transfers.  The presumption is that the regulation of trans-
fers other than assignments is left to state law.  The language is obviously pertinent to the 
treatment of security interests in trademarks, which are not assignments under the Lan-
ham Act.  Because the Lanham Act does not regulate security interests in trademarks, 
trademarks are presumptively regulated by state law.  See In re Roman Cleanser Co., 43 
B.R. 940, 944 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) (holding that a grant of a security interest is not 
an assignment because “[i]t is a mere agreement to assign in the event of a default by the 
debtor”); In re Chattanooga Choo-Choo Co., 98 B.R. 792 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989).  In 
contrast, security interests are transfers for the purposes of the Copyright Act.  See In re 
Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd., 116 B.R. 194 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990).  Because the 
Copyright and Lanham Acts provide filing requirements for transfers or assignments of 
the protected work, the question of whether a security interest is a transfer or assignment 
is critical.  If a security interest in a copyright is a transfer, then the interest must be re-
corded with the Copyright Office under section 205 of the Copyright Act.  17 U.S.C. § 
205.  If a security interest in trademark is an assignment, then the interest must be re-
corded with the P.T.O. under 15 U.S.C. § 1060. 
35. See 17 U.S.C. § 801. 
36. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of 
Security Interests: Taking Debtors’ Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021 (1994), for an 
overview of theories analyzing secured credit as a property relationship.  Harris and 
Mooney survey the current state of the debate regarding the efficacy of secured credit 
and the reason for secured creditors’ priority in bankruptcy.  Id.  See Lynn M. LoPucki, 
The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887 (1994), for a well conceived 
objection to the arguments in favor of the law of secured credit and a general critique of 
economic analyses of secured credit. 
37. The debtor’s ability to utilize the same collateral for two different debts is lim-
ited by the requirements that a secured creditor can perfect only by possession, rather 
than through filing or through automatic perfection.  The filing requirement, detailed in 
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ship, except for granting the secured creditor the right to attach the 
collateral in the case of default.38  The rights of the secured credi-
tor vis-à-vis the debtor are purely contractual ones, protected by a 
property rule, i.e., the right to obtain the property from the debtor 
in case of default.39  The secured creditor, however, also obtains 
rights vis-à-vis other secured creditors.40  Specifically, under arti-
cle 9, if the secured creditor can perfect or file his rights in the col-
lateral before other creditors with interests in the same collateral, 
then the secured creditor obtains priority in the settlement of the 
debt.41  This priority can arise in state court proceedings against 
the debtor or in federal bankruptcy proceedings in which the 
 
section 9-302(1) of the U.C.C., excludes money and instruments, which includes a nego-
tiable instrument or “any other writing that evidences a right to the payment of money” 
other than a security interest or chattel paper, from the available types of collateral.  
U.C.C. § 9-302(1) (1995).  Money and instruments can be perfected only through posses-
sion by the secured creditor.  See id. § 9-304(1).  Although possession is always a per-
missive means of perfecting a security interest for a range of collateral under section 9-
305, the most common way to perfect is through filing. 
38. The secured party’s rights to collect on the debt, to take possession of the col-
lateral, and to dispose of the collateral upon possession are provided in the U.C.C.  Id. §§ 
9-502, 9-503, 9-504.  “Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to 
take possession of the collateral.  In taking possession a secured party may proceed with-
out judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by 
action.”  Id. § 9-503. 
39. There is a conceptual problem as to whether this right constitutes a property 
rule or liability rule.  If the creditor obtains the full value of the debt by taking possession 
of the collateral, then the creditor has essentially obtained specific performance on the 
debt.  The remedy can be described as a property rule protecting the creditor’s right to 
exclude the debtor from use of the collateral upon default.  If the creditor does not obtain 
full value, however, he may still have deficiency rights against the debtor.  In this case, 
the creditor arguably has not obtained full property rule protection for the debt obliga-
tion.  The problem is exacerbated because disposing of the collateral through a judicial 
sale or auction may constitute a waiver of deficiency rights.  See id. § 9-504(4) (stating 
that disposition discharges security interests).  In the last two scenarios, the remedy can 
be seen as a type of Spur injunction, in which a party gets to exercise his rights but must 
compensate the other party for any harm caused.  Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb 
Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).  In this case, the debtor is allowed to default on the 
debt but can pay the secured creditor an amount less than the full value of the obligation.  
See Saul Levmore, Love it or Leave it: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Exclusivity of 
Remedies in Partnership and Marriage, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (1995); Shubha 
Ghosh, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Termination Rights, 75 OR. L. REV. (forth-
coming 1998). 
40. See U.C.C. § 9-504. 
41. See id. § 9-301. 
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debtor’s obligations are liquidated or restructured.42  Compared to 
other secured creditors with lower priority, the secured creditor’s 
rights in the collateral are protected by a property rule. 
Once the laws of copyright, trademark, and secured credit are 
viewed in terms of property rules and liability rules, it is easier to 
see the sources of conflict.  Nevertheless, current proposals to rec-
oncile the intellectual property laws with the law of secured 
credit43 are flawed because they overlook the critical inconsisten-
cies between those regimes.  The shortcomings of the reform pro-
posals reflect fundamental differences between the views of intel-
lectual property optimists, who believe in broad protections for 
creative works, and intellectual property pessimists, who believe in 
minimal protections for creators.44 
This Article approaches the conflict from the perspective of an 
intellectual property optimist, advocating more protection for intel-
lectual property owners and less for creditors and licensees.  Part I 
sets forth the background of intellectual property and secured 
credit.  Part II suggests ways to allocate property rights between 
secured creditors and licensors or licensees of technology.  Be-
cause a system of secured credit protection is truly tested by its op-
eration in bankruptcy, Part III analyzes bankruptcy problems aris-
ing from the use of copyrights and trademarks as collateral.  Part 
IV, which details the differences between intellectual property op-
timists and intellectual property pessimists, reveals how the Bank-
ruptcy Code and article 9 of the U.C.C. currently undermine im-
portant and substantive interests of copyright and trademark.  Part 
 
42. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (providing priorities under Bankruptcy Code). 
43. See, e.g., PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE U.C.C., REPORT OF THE 
ARTICLE 9 STUDY COMMITTEE 49, 54 (1992) (discussing proposals to reform article 9). 
44. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF 
COPYRIGHT FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 16-21 (1994) [hereinafter 
COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY] (distinguishing between copyright optimists who argue that 
“there is no harm in extending copyright to encompass the economically valuable uses 
that may fill copyright’s cup” and copyright pessimists who ask “[i]f a copyrighted work 
can be so easily viewed or copied, . . . what harm is there in excusing these additional 
uses from copyright liability”).  Although Professor Goldstein distinguishes between 
“copyright optimists” and “copyright pessimists,” this Article generalizes his distinction 
to encompass trademark as well as copyright.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
The author adopts the perspective of the intellectual property optimist solely for the 
purpose of grounding the analysis of this Article. 
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V critiques several reform proposals, including reforms aimed at 
security interests in copyright, trademark, and computer software 
licensing.  This Article concludes that the perspective of the intel-
lectual property optimist will generate the most effective reform 
proposals to reconcile the law of intellectual property with the law 
of secured credit. 
I. BACKGROUND:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND SECURED 
CREDIT 
Intellectual property law covers three broad areas under federal 
law: copyrights,45 trademarks,46 and patents;47 and covers several 
incidental areas under state law, such as trade secret law48 and un-
fair competition law.49  The law of secured credit encompasses 
both state and federal law.  The primary body of state law is article 
9 of the U.C.C.,50 which governs the rights of secured creditors 
against the debtor and other creditors.51  Although article 9 has its 
own provisions for enforcement,52 the biggest implications of arti-
cle 9 are for the federal law of bankruptcy, in which the legal dis-
putes between the creditors and the debtor are settled.  This part 
begins by providing a quick introduction to the respective property 
regimes of intellectual property and secured credit law.  Next, it 
discusses whether the two regimes are consistent; first by employ-
ing a hypothetical example to show the two systems at work, and 
second, by highlighting and categorizing the conflicts between the 
two regimes. 
A. Two Property Rights Regimes: Intellectual Property Law 
and Secured Credit Law 
Intellectual property law and the law of secured credit present 
 
45. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994). 
46. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994). 
47. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994). 
48. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426 (West 1997) (Uniform Trade Secrets Act). 
49. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 360-l (McKinney 1997) (providing for injunc-
tive relief against “injury to business reputation” and against “dilution of the distinctive 
quality of a mark”). 
50. U.C.C. § 9 (1995). 
51. Id. § 9-201. 
52. Id. §§ 9-501-9-507. 
GHOSH.TYP 9/29/2006  4:47 PM 
1997] MORPHING OF PROPERTY RULES AND LIABILITY RULES 111 
two different property rights regimes with different goals and 
mechanisms.  Intellectual property law protects creative efforts and 
allows creators to exclude others from using the product of such 
efforts.53  Copyright protects “original works of authorship” and 
gives the author the right to exclude others from using, copying, or 
compiling the work.54  Unauthorized users or copiers of the work 
can be enjoined and sued for damages, usually measured by lost 
profits.55  Trademark law, on the other hand, protects the trade-
mark holder’s right to use a mark to designate origin and signal 
quality on products traded through interstate commerce.56 
Although distinct bodies of law, copyright and trademark laws 
may overlap with respect to subject matter.57  For example, copy-
right law would protect the underlying computer code in a multi-
media compact disk game, and trademark law would protect the 
trade or brand name of the product.  In this way, different aspects 
of the same product would be protected by both trademark and 
copyright law. 
The law of secured credit also protects various dimensions of a 
product.  Whereas intellectual property law protects the fruits of 
creative efforts, the state law of federal credit protect the interests 
that creditors may have in a particular property against claims of 
 
53. See COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, supra note 44, at 9-11. 
54. See discussion supra note 25 and accompanying text (describing copyright pro-
tection). 
55. See discussion supra note 26 (providing statutory provisions relating to copy-
right infringement). 
56. See supra note 31 (citing to the Lanham Act). 
57. The subject matter of copyrights often overlaps with that of trademarks.  For 
example, “[w]hen the Walt Disney Company gets a court order stopping the publication 
of unauthorized cartoons featuring Mickey Mouse, it is not only because Mickey Mouse 
is a trademark, indicating Disney as its source, but also because Disney owns the copy-
right in the Mickey Mouse image.”  COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, supra note 44, at 10.  Copy-
right law and trademark law also overlap in the area of gray market protection: 
If gray marketeers are allegedly violating the goodwill of and investment in 
distinctive trademarks, then trademark law is arguably the more appropriate 
basis for the claim; copyright law is intended to protect creative efforts.  This 
argument, however, is too formalistic.  The process of creating distinctive 
marks is as much a creative effort as writing a novel or painting a picture. 
Shubha Ghosh, An Economic Analysis of the Common Control Exception to Gray Market 
Exclusion, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 373, 397 (1994). 
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the debtor and claims by other creditors.58  For example, the crea-
tor of a multimedia game can use the copyrights and trademark 
that he owns in his creation as collateral to obtain credit to finance 
his creation.59  Secured credit creates a split ownership situation in 
which the creditor is given a property interest in the debtor’s as-
sets.60  In this way, the law carves up various dimensions of a 
product and protects interests that different groups might have in 
the same product. 
B. Are the Two Property Rights Regimes Consistent? 
The difficult question is whether the various protections af-
forded by intellectual property law and the law of secured credit 
are consistent.  To see the problem, consider the following exam-
ple.  Merges plans to develop and market computer software under 
the trademark “DiskCo.”  He has a prototype of the software that 
he has privately tested, but needs to fund his broader project of 
manufacturing, marketing, and distributing the product.  In order to 
raise the necessary capital, Merges obtains a loan from Nimmer 
and secures the loan through Merges’s tangible property, such as 
office furniture, through Merges’s interests in accounts receivable, 
and through Merges’s intellectual property rights in both the soft-
ware program and the trademark.  This section analyzes how vari-
ous protections of intellectual property law and secured credit law 
play out in this situation.  First, this section shows what rights exist 
under the two property systems, and second, it examines conflicts 
 
58. See U.C.C. § 9-201. 
59. See Haemmerli, supra note 11. 
60. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 36, at 2037-42.  The “split ownership” situa-
tion in the secured credit context is the reason that security interests were suspect at 
common law.  A grant of a security interest without corresponding transfer of possession 
was viewed as a fraudulent conveyance.  See Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925) 
(invalidating security interest because creditor allowed debtor dominion and control over 
assets and proceeds).  The rule of Benedict v. Ratner has been expressly rejected in sec-
tion 9-205 of the U.C.C., which states that “a security interest is not invalid or fraudulent 
against creditors by reason of liberty in the debtor to use, commingle, or dispose of all or 
part of the collateral.”  U.C.C. § 9-205; see also Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, 
Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 
175, 212 (1983) (stating that “the law of secured transactions has ordered itself around” 
the principle that “[p]ossession of personal property is the best evidence of its owner-
ship”). 
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that occur when these two systems interact. 
1. The Two Property Rights Regimes At Work 
As an initial matter, Merges obtains the protection of copyright 
law when the work is placed in a tangible medium of expression.61  
Therefore, as soon as Merges encodes the program on a disk elec-
tronically, Merges will obtain copyright protection for his work.  
Nevertheless, in order to secure his rights to sue, Merges must reg-
ister his copyright with the Copyright Office.62 
Merges would also like to obtain trademark protection for the 
mark “DiskCo.”  Obtaining trademark protection, however, is 
more complicated than acquiring copyright protection.63  First, 
Merges must actually use or intend to use the mark in commerce; 
for example, by making some initial sales of the program with the 
mark.64  Second, Merges must submit an application to the Patent 
and Trademark Office (“P.T.O.”) to review the mark.65  The P.T.O. 
will grant Merges’s application if the mark is distinctive, not oth-
erwise duplicative, and does not infringe on existing marks.66  
Once the P.T.O. grants Merges a trademark in “DiskCo,” Merges 
is allowed to use the mark of his product in the specific geographic 
area of distribution.67  After registering the mark with the P.T.O., 
Merges will be allowed to sue for infringing uses by other distribu-
 
61. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). 
62. According to one commentator, “[r]egistration is not a condition of copyright 
protection, and a copyright owner may obtain registration for her work at any time during 
the copyright term.”  COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, supra note 44, at 549.  Registration is a 
prerequisite to sue for statutory damages and attorney’s fees.  See 17 U.S.C. § 412.  Reg-
istration is also a requirement for filing a copyright infringement action against works 
originating in the United States.  See id. § 411(a). 
63. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1994) (trademark protection requirements), with 17 
U.S.C. § 409 (copyright protection requirements). 
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051.  “Use in commerce” means the “bona fide use of a mark 
in the ordinary course of trade, and not merely to reserve a right in a mark.”  Id. § 1127. 
65. See id. § 1051 (detailing application process); see also COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, 
supra note 44, at 202-04 (describing the application process). 
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (standards for distinctiveness).  The standards are also 
governed by the common law.  See Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311 
(1871). 
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (scope of statutory rights).  See United Drug Co. v. 
Rectanus, 248 U.S. 90 (1918), for a discussion of the geographic boundaries of trademark 
rights. 
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tors.  If the P.T.O. fails to grant the application, Merges can still 
use the mark, assuming that it does not infringe on other marks, 
and has rights under state and federal unfair competition law to sue 
for deceptive or misleading uses of the mark.68 
The rights of Nimmer, Merges’s creditor, in the secured loan 
extended to Merges are protected by the law of secured credit.  Ini-
tially, Nimmer must secure his rights against Merges through a 
contract that states the amount of the loan, the conditions of re-
payment, and the type of collateral used to secure the loan.69  The 
relationship between Merges and Nimmer is governed wholly by 
the common law of contracts,70 although article 9 of the U.C.C. 
specifies the types of items that Merges can use as collateral and 
the manner in which the collateral needs to be described to create a 
valid security interest.71 
Nimmer, however, also needs to secure his rights in Merges’s 
assets against the rest of the world.  Merges is perfectly free to bor-
row more money from other creditors and even secure the loans 
with the same assets used to secure the loan from Nimmer.72  In 
order to protect his rights, Nimmer must perfect his security inter-
est in Merges’s assets by filing a financing statement at the state 
level.73  This filing, listed under Merges’s name, describes the na-
ture of Nimmer’s security interest and sets the date to establish 
Nimmer’s priority in case there is a conflict with other creditors, 
especially those who have also taken a security interest in the same 
 
68. The state law claims include passing off, dilution, and misappropriation.  See 
COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, supra note 44, at 55-112; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (governing 
federal claims). 
69. Article 9 of the U.C.C. “applies to security interests created by contract, includ-
ing pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust [and] deed . . . .”  U.C.C. § 
9-102(2) (1995).  A security interest is created through a security agreement between the 
debtor and the creditor.  The security agreement is effective upon (1) the signing of an 
agreement that contains a description of the collateral in which the debtor has rights, and 
(2) value is given to the debtor.  See id. § 9-203(1). 
70. See generally Delaware v. New York, 507 U.S. 490, 503 (stating that the pri-
mary rule regarding intangible personal property, such as debts, flowed from the com-
mon law concept of mobilia sequuntur personam). 
71. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203, 9-204, 9-205. 
72. See id. § 9-205. 
73. This is usually done with the Secretary of State.  See id. § 9-402. 
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assets.74 
Interestingly enough, there is a concrete parallel between the 
system of property rights protection under copyright and trademark 
laws and under the state law of secured credit.  Each system has its 
own method of registration whereby property rights are publicized 
to the rest of the world.75  Each requires a description of the under-
lying property interest.  Unlike the state system of registering secu-
rity interests, the federal system of registering intellectual property 
rights in trademarks requires review by an administrative board.76  
Registration of copyrights involves far less review than registration 
of trademarks,77 but more so than filing a security interest under 
state law.78  A state filing is done under the debtor’s name in order 
to facilitate the identification of the debtor by other creditors,79 
however, a federal filing is registered under the particular property 
that is protected.80 
Just as registration of copyrights and trademarks creates rights 
to sue for infringement under federal law,81 filing a security inter-
est secures rights in legal battles between the debtor and other 
creditors under state law.82  At the state level, a secured creditor 
can sue a defaulting debtor and attach the underlying collateral de-
scribed in the financing statement.  The right to attach usually 
means the right to sell the collateral in a public sale for the benefit 
of the debtor, in order to recover proceeds on the debt. 
Filing a security interest has even greater implications at the 
federal level.  If the debtor is forced into bankruptcy, a secured 
creditor has priority in the liquidation of claims over other credi-
 
74. See id. 
75. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 408, 409 (1994) (discussing copyright registration); see also 
15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (1994) (discussing trademark registration); U.C.C. § 9-402 (discuss-
ing registration of secured transactions). 
76. The registration and contestability proceedings are reviewed by the P.T.O. and 
are under the jurisdiction of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1063-1070. 
77. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 408-410. 
78. See U.C.C. §§ 9-402, 9-403. 
79. See id. §§ 9-402(3), 9-403(4). 
80. See 17 U.S.C. § 410 (describing requirements of copyright registration); 15 
U.S.C. § 1060 (describing requirements of trademark registration). 
81. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 411, 501; 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
82. See U.C.C. §§ 9-203, 9-503, 9-504. 
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tors.83  So, if Merges enters into bankruptcy and Nimmer has made 
the appropriate state filings, Nimmer’s claims over Merges’s col-
lateral, which would be a part of Merges’s estate in bankruptcy, 
will obtain priority over other claims.  Contrast this with the fate of 
unsecured creditors, those who extended loans without obtaining a 
security interest in collateral, or secured creditors who failed to file 
correctly; both receive only a pro-rata share of the funds remaining 
in the debtor’s estate after all secured claims and other priority 
claims are settled.84  Thus, the cost of not filing is the loss of re-
covery on the underlying debt.85 
2. Conflicts Between the Two Property Rights Regimes 
The laws of copyright and trademark and the law of secured 
credit provide complementary schemes to protect the rights of the 
debtor-entrepreneur and the creditor.  In our hypothetical, how-
ever, some conflicts become apparent as we contrast the different 
types of collateral in which Nimmer has taken a security interest.  
This section divides the respective obstacles into recording, fuzzi-
ness, and Bankruptcy Code problems to facilitate an understanding 
of the arising conflicts. 
a. Recording Problems 
Nimmer’s security interests are in three types of property: per-
sonal property (equipment), intangible property (accounts receiv-
able), and intellectual property (copyrights and trademarks).  To 
perfect his interests in each of these assets, Nimmer must file a 
complete and accurate financing statement covering the respective 
properties.86  The first difficult question is where to file.  Article 9 
provides that security interests in equipment and intangibles can be 
perfected through an appropriate state filing.87  Intangibles, for the 
purpose of article 9, include not only accounts receivables but also 
intellectual property.88  Article 9 provides that when property is 
 
83. See id. §§ 9-301, 9-306(4). 
84. See id. §§ 9-301, 9-401. 
85. See id. § 9-301. 
86. See id. § 9-302(1). 
87. See id. § 9-401 (laying out alternative schemes for state filings). 
88. Id. § 9-106. 
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governed by federal law, federal law applies to the perfection of 
security interests.89  In other words, article 9 incorporates applica-
ble federal law.90  Under section 205 of the Copyright Act,91 all 
transfers and assignments of copyrights may be recorded,92 and 
section 205 contains its own provisions for priority disputes be-
tween assignees and transferees of the same copyright.93  Section 
10 of the Lanham Act94 has a similar provision for the recording of 
assignments of trademarks and the resolution of priority disputes 
among assignees.95 
Determining whether a security interest is a transfer or an as-
signment is essential to understanding the application of the law.  
The distinction between transfer and assignment rests on whether 
title in the underlying property passes.  If title does not pass, then 
the interest is transferred;96 if title does pass, the interest is as-
signed.97  Security interests are transfers and not assignments,98 
therefore, under a strict reading of the Copyright Act and the 
Lanham Act, the security interest in the copyright must be re-
corded at the federal level and the security interest in the trade-
mark need not be.99 
In any case, the complication introduced by the Copyright Act 
does not, on its surface, severely undermine the manner in which 
the law protects secured creditors—the wrinkle added is the need 
 
89. According to its terms, article 9 “does not apply . . . to a security interest subject 
to any statute of the United States, to the extent that such statute governs the rights of 
parties to and third parties affected by transactions in particular types of property . . . .”  
Id. § 9-104(a). 
90. See id. § 9-104, cmt. 1. 
91. See 17 U.S.C. § 205 (1994). 
92. See id. § 205(a). 
93. See id. § 205(d). 
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1994). 
95. See id. 
96. A “transfer” is defined as “[a]n act of the parties, or of the law, by which the 
title to property is conveyed from one person to another.”  BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 
1497 (6th ed. 1990). 
97. “An ‘assignment’ of a trademark is an absolute transfer of the entire right, title 
and interest to the trademark.”  In re Roman Cleanser Co., 43 B.R. 940, 944 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 1984); cf. In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd., 116 B.R. 194 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
1990) (discussing “transfers” under section 205 of Copyright Act). 
98. See Roman Cleanser, 43 B.R. at 945. 
99. See id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1994). 
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for an additional filing.  This wrinkle, however, introduces several 
elements of uncertainty into the process of perfecting security in-
terests.  The first issue is whether a dual filing, rather than a single 
filing with the Copyright Office, is required to perfect one’s inter-
est.  The second element of uncertainty concerns conflicts between 
the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act, when each statute arguably 
protects the intellectual property at issue.  The third problem is in 
regard to determining which priority rules should apply in the con-
text of a dual filing—a choice between the state rules and those 
found in the Copyright Act.  The fourth issue arises because, under 
state law, the filing of a financing statement lapses unless the 
creditor files a continuation statement, and no similar provision ex-
ists under the Copyright Act.  Thus, it is unclear which rule gov-
erns the interests of a secured creditor.  The resolution of these is-
sues has been uncertain100 and most practitioners have adopted a 
“belt and suspenders”101 approach, thereby filing all intellectual 
property interests under both the state and the federal systems, 
while hoping that the security interest can obtain the fullest protec-
tion. 
The conflicts arising from the appropriate place to file are 
mostly technical.  There are, however, more deeply conceptual 
conflicts that arise from the use of trademarks and copyrights as 
collateral.  The key to a security interest in property is the separa-
tion of ownership and possession.102  Even though the debtor may 
physically own the collateral, the debtor is not the full owner be-
 
100. According to the court in Roman Cleanser: 
Commentators who address the question admit that 15 U.S.C. § 1060 presents 
problems of construction and does not clearly establish a method for perfecting 
a security interest in trademarks. . . .  Not only is there a lack of agreement as 
to whether section 1060 provides for the recordation of security interests with 
respect to trademarks[,] but, additionally, the commentators who assume that a 
Lanham Act filing is required, do not agree as to what documents are to be 
filed. 
Roman Cleanser, 43 B.R. at 945. 
101. See Shawn K. Baldwin, “To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful 
Arts”: A Role for Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property as Collateral, 143 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1701, 1708-16 (1995); Haemmerli, supra note 11, at 1657-60; Elise B. May, 
Where your priorities should be: Analysis of the perfection and priority of security inter-
ests in copyrights as it affects bankruptcy, 11 BANK. DEV. J. 509, 535 (1995). 
102. See Lisa M. Vaccaro, Security Interests in Intellectual Property: Toward a 
Unified System of Perfection, 6 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 215 (1993). 
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cause the secured creditor has the right to attach the collateral in 
the case of default.103 
In the classic case of Benedict v Ratner,104 the separation of 
ownership and possession created by secured credit troubled the 
court to such an extent that the court held the contractual relation-
ship between creditor and debtor, which created the security inter-
est, fraudulent and void.105  The problem was largely one of notice.  
According to the court, if possession did not equal full ownership, 
creditors would be susceptible to great harm.106 
The system of recording security interests under article 9 was 
designed to resolve this issue by creating a means by which the 
creditor can publicize his interests in the debtor’s property, just as 
the system of recording title in real property publicizes the owner’s 
interest to the rest of the world.107  To the extent that copyright and 
trademark recordation systems conflict, the goal of providing no-
tice to other secured creditors is undermined and the secured trans-
action takes on the character of the “secret lien,”108 which was 
struck down in Benedict v. Ratner.109 
b. Fuzziness Problems 
A system of recording security interests can solve only part of 
the problems created by the use of intellectual property.  Rights in 
tangible and real property can be ascertained readily through a re-
 
103. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 23.03 
(1996). 
104. See discussion supra note 60 (describing the problem in Benedict v. Ratner). 
105. See Vaccaro, supra note 102, at 364-65. 
106. See id. at 362-64. 
107. “The solution adopted by the draftsmen [of article 9] . . . provid[es] [a] simple 
means of notifying competing creditors of the security interest.”  WILLIAM TWINING, 
KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 334 (1973). 
108. “Secret Lien” means a non-U.C.C., non-filed lien.  See Marie T. Reilly, The 
Latent Efficiency of Fraudulent Transfer Law, 57 LA. L. REV. 1213, 1245 & n.155 
(1997). 
109. See BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ¶ 1.08[1][E] (rev ed. 1993), for a discussion of these issues 
as applied to copyrights.  See also id. ¶ 1.08[1][G] (discussing application to trademarks).  
See generally Harold R. Weinberg & William J. Woodward, Jr., Easing Transfers and 
Security Interest Transactions in Intellectual Property: An Agenda for Reform, 79 KY. 
L.J. 61, 72-84 (1990) (explaining issue of notice and ease of creating security interests). 
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cording system.  With real property, rights can be divided among 
only three dimensions: time, space, and person.  Tangible property, 
such as equipment, can be similarly divided through the leasing of 
the property to third parties.  Intangible property can be divided in 
more complicated ways, especially through securitization;110 ac-
counts receivable can be traded and divided up among potential 
investors. 
Intellectual property rights, in a similar vein, can be divided in-
finitely.  Ownership of a copyright entitles the owner to have ex-
clusive right to reproduce, adapt, publish, perform, and display the 
copyrighted work.111  Ownership of a trademark entitles the owner 
to use the protected mark to designate products for sale within a 
particular geographic area.112  Copyright and trademark owners 
can subdivide and license off their rights in many more ways than 
holders of tangible or intangible properties.113  Furthermore, the 
extent of protection accorded to copyrights and trademarks is po-
tentially much greater than that accorded to other property.114 
In addition, the boundaries of copyright and trademark are 
fuzzy.  The owner of a trademark can enjoin the use of a mark that 
is similar to his own mark and potentially deceptive.115  Similarly, 
the owner of a copyright can enjoin and obtain recovery not only 
for direct copies of the work, but also for copies of work that could 
 
110. See FRANK J. FABOZZI & FRANCO MODIGLIANI, CAPITAL MARKETS: 
INSTITUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS 569-70 (1992). 
111. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). 
112. See Natural Footware Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1394 
(1985) (quoting Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916)). 
113. It is impossible to make this comparison in a quantitative, precise way.  Con-
sequently, the boundaries of copyright and trademark are less clear than those of real 
property and other intangible property.  “Some objects of property claims indeed seem to 
resist clear demarcations altogether.”  Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Prop-
erty, in PROPERTY & PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF 
OWNERSHIP 17 (1994) (demonstrating limits on principle of possession as defining own-
ership of a property right); see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 125-128 (1996) (illustrating difficulties in drawing boundaries of copyright 
and trademark). 
114. Cf. Jeff C. Dodd, Rights in Information: Conversion of Misappropriation 
Causes of Action in Intellectual Property, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 459, 463 (1995) (explaining 
that common law tort causes of actions have not yet afforded same protections as the 
Trademark and Copyright Acts). 
115. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994). 
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be derived from the copyrighted material.  Although indistinct 
boundaries make the sweep of copyright and trademark protection 
quite broad, the fuzziness also creates uncertainty as to what is, in 
fact, protected.  For example, a secured creditor must determine 
how to actually value the intellectual property in which he will ob-
tain an interest.116 
c. Bankruptcy Code Problems 
If the fuzziness created by intellectual property were solely one 
of certainty and notice, for the purposes of valuation and publicity, 
the resolution would be a more extensive, albeit more complicated, 
system of recordation.  Such a system would resolve not only con-
flicts between different secured creditors, but also disputes be-
tween creditors and all other individuals who have an interest in 
the intellectual property via licenses or assignments.117  A more 
elaborate system of recordation, however, would not resolve the 
problems created by the Bankruptcy Code. 
Grasping the problems engendered by specific provisions of 
the Bankruptcy Code is impossible without comprehending the 
Bankruptcy Code as a whole.  To aid understanding, this part pro-
vides a brief overview of the Bankruptcy Code.  In addition, this 
part explores section 365, which provides the most difficulties for 
the purposes of this Article. 
i. Overview of the Bankruptcy Code 
Federal bankruptcy law provides a procedure through which a 
debtor can obtain a “fresh start,” either through the liquidation of 
claims or through reorganization.118  Within bankruptcy, secured 
 
116. See Haemmerli, supra note 11, at 1651-53; see also In re Specialty Foods of 
Pittsburgh, Inc., 91 B.R. 364, 372-73 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1988) (rejecting the creditor’s 
challenge over the value of assets because of the rule that the best offer obtainable by the 
trustee for the debtor’s property is “conclusive on the issue of value”). 
117. See Haemmerli, supra note 11, at 1721-52 (describing various reform propos-
als); Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 109, at 79-108 (same). 
118. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 31-36 
(1993) (providing a overview of the goals of bankruptcy law); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE 
LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 1-6 (1986) [hereinafter LOGIC & LIMITS] (same); 
Judge Richard A. Posner, Foreword to CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY xi-xiii (Jagdeep S. 
Bhandari & Lawrence A Weiss eds. 1996) (same).  See Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy 
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creditors who have perfected their interests obtain priority, in the 
liquidation of claims, over other secured creditors who have failed 
to perfect and all unsecured creditors.119  Perfected secured credi-
tors also receive priority in bankruptcy reorganizations.120  Before 
either liquidation or reorganization occurs, however, the debtor, 
through the trustee, must assemble the bankruptcy estate.121 
The bankruptcy trustee has extensive powers to affect the as-
sembly of the debtor’s estate, including (1) the “strong arm power” 
to exercise state law rights against third parties that have recovered 
from the estate, prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition;122 (2) 
the power to recover preferential payments made to third parties, 
prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition;123 and (3) the power 
to recover payments made by the debtor to third parties, prior to 
bankruptcy, as fraudulent conveyances.124  Coextensive with these 
powers is the right of the debtor to assume or reject outstanding 
obligations existing at the time of bankruptcy in executory con-
tracts.125  Under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee 
can elect, at his discretion, either to maintain ongoing contractual 
obligations through bankruptcy or to breach the obligations giving 
rise to claims in bankruptcy by a creditor.126  The implication is 
 
Law in Perspective, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 953 (1981), for an argument that bankruptcy 
law often conflicts with preexisting federal and state laws. 
119. See 11 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). 
120. See id. §§ 1123-1132 (stating priority rules for reorganizations). 
121. See ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLIAM D. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY 32-33 (1993) 
(concluding that assembly of debtor’s estate serves two purposes, namely, determination 
of liquidation under Chapter 7 and scope of automatic stay under section 362); see also 
11 U.S.C. § 541 (presenting rules for assembling debtor’s estate). 
122. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (providing strong arm powers of trustee, and giving 
trustee powers of judicial lien creditor to avoid any transfer of property of debtor). 
123. See id. §§ 547(b), 547(c). 
124. See id. § 548. 
125. See id. § 365.  Even though the provision pertaining to executory contracts is 
contained in the section of the Bankruptcy Code covering “Case Administration,” con-
ceptually, the Bankruptcy Code’s treatment of executory contracts is better seen as an 
issue pertaining to the assembly of the debtor’s estate.  See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., 
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 133 (1994) [hereinafter GAME THEORY] (noting parallel be-
tween sections 365 and 541(c)); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of 
Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 247-50 (1989) (arguing that trustee’s powers 
under section 365 are meant to be exercised for benefit of estate in manner analogous to 
trustee’s powers under section 541). 
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 365. 
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that the debtor has the power to continue performing contractual 
obligations that are profitable to perform or to liquidate his obliga-
tions for a reduced amount under bankruptcy.127 
From a property rights perspective, the Bankruptcy Code pro-
tects the debtor’s contractual rights through a property rule, while 
the non-bankruptcy law would only accord liability rule protec-
tion.128  The debtor in bankruptcy can elect to maintain pre-
bankruptcy contractual relationships, even if the contract is not 
profitable from the perspective of the non-debtor contracting party.  
Although the non-debtor party can breach the contract and provide 
the debtor with a legal claim to add to the debtor’s estate, the 
debtor can elect to breach and liquidate his claims to the non-
debtor as the debtor would all other obligations to unsecured credi-
tors.129  Bankruptcy allows the debtor to breach at reduced cost and 
if the debtor’s claims are substantial, as they often will be, the 
debtor can effectively “take” from the non-debtor party without 
paying.130 
ii. Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code 
In the late 1980s, section 365 created a host of problems that 
led to amendment of the section.131  The foremost problem arose in 
 
127. See GAME THEORY, supra note 125, at 131-37; Westbrook, supra note 125, at 
263-75. 
128. The bargaining game between creditors and debtors is complex, and the possi-
bility to hold up or cram down reorganization plans may alter the manner in which rights 
are protected within bankruptcy.  For discussion at this point, this Article adopts the sim-
ple application of the bankruptcy rules independent of how the rules affect strategies 
within bankruptcy.  See GAME THEORY, supra note 125, at 232-34, for a discussion of a 
richer and more detailed bargaining game. 
129. See Westbrook, supra note 125, at 252-55. 
130. See generally id. at 257 (describing the debtor’s right to breach contracts).  
According to one commentator: 
Even in a case in which the bankruptcy court’s estimate might give the Other 
Party a damage claim that is undercompensatory, denial of specific relief is the 
fairest result.  Because bankruptcy almost always yields very low recoveries 
for all creditors, the Other Party’s understated claim probably will result in a 
distribution closer to equality with the other creditors than would granting spe-
cific performance. 
Id. 
131. The controversy was created by Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal 
Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that debtor-licensor of intellectual 
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the context of intellectual property licenses.132  If the debtor was 
the licensor of software and entered into bankruptcy, the debtor 
could, under the prior version of section 365, elect not to continue 
the license and enjoin the licensee from use of the software.133  Al-
though the licensee would have a claim for breach of the license, 
the claim would be an unsecured one and would not result in full 
recovery for the licensee.134  Furthermore, the licensee could not 
enjoin the licensor from breaching the agreement and is unable to 
continue using the software because of the automatic stay provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code.135  As a result, licensees of intellec-
tual property assumed the risk of losing their right to use the li-
censed technology. 
In response to the complaints of software licensees, Congress 
resolved this problem by amending section 365(a) through section 
365(n), which gave the licensee the right to elect continued use of 
the intellectual property or a claim in bankruptcy, in the event of a 
breach by the licensor.136  Although the provisions of section 
365(n) solved some of the problems faced by intellectual property 
licensees, two gaps remained: (1) the treatment of licensors should 
the licensee enter bankruptcy, and (2) the exclusion of trademarks 
from the definition of intellectual property under the Bankruptcy 
 
property could unilaterally rescind license under section 365, relieving licensee of all 
rights under terms of license).  See Westbrook, supra note 125, at 305-315, for a discus-
sion of the legal and policy debates.  See also J. Dianne Brinson, Software Distribution 
Agreements and Bankruptcy: The Licensor’s Perspective, 64 WASH. L. REV. 499 (1989) 
(arguing that amendments to section 365 do not adequately protect licensor’s rights in 
bankruptcy); John J. Fry, The Rejection of Executory Contracts Under the Intellectual 
Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 621 (1989) (arguing 
that amendments are largely successful); Mary A. Moy, The Intellectual Property Bank-
ruptcy Protection Act: An Unbalanced Solution to the International Software Licensing 
Dilemma, 11 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 151 (1989) (arguing that amendments have been 
largely ineffective in international arena). 
132. See John P. Musone, Crystallizing the Intellectual Property Licenses in Bank-
ruptcy Act: A Proposed Solution to achieve Congress’ Intent, 13 BANK. DEV. J. 509, 512 
(1997). 
133. See Brinson, supra note 131; Moy, supra note 131. 
134. See Westbrook, supra note 125. 
135. See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994) (providing rules regarding auto-
matic stays under the Bankruptcy Code). 
136. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n). 
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Code.137 
Section 365 converts liability rules under non-bankruptcy law 
into property rules in bankruptcy.  In the context of a bankruptcy 
filing by the licensor of intellectual property, liability rule protec-
tion for the licensee is converted into property rule protection.  If 
the licensee files bankruptcy, however, the licensee obtains full 
property rule protection for rights under the license and the licen-
sor receives almost no protection. 
The conflict in property rights regimes is exacerbated by the 
introduction of secured credit.  Suppose Merges owns and operates 
a bookstore chain called “NoBorders.”  Merges franchises the op-
eration to Nimmer.  The franchise agreement includes rights in the 
use of the trademark “NoBorders” and rights to use specially de-
signed inventory-software in which Merges owns the copyright.  
Nimmer uses a secured loan from Bank to finance the purchase of 
the franchise.  In return, Bank takes a security interest in the 
trademark and the copyrighted software, and properly perfects its 
interest. 
Merges files for bankruptcy and, under section 365, elects to 
reject the license.  Nimmer exercises his section 365(n) election to 
continue use of the software.  Nimmer, nevertheless, cannot make 
such an election with regard to the trademark because the Bank-
ruptcy Code does not include trademarks in the definition of intel-
lectual property under section 101(35A).  Although Nimmer will 
have a claim for breach against Merges for Merges’s rejection of 
the trademark license, the claim will only be an unsecured one.  
Furthermore, it is unclear how Bank’s security interest in the 
trademark should be treated under the law.  Uncertainty exists as to 
whether Bank has lost its interest because Bank’s rights were 
purely derived from Nimmer’s license with Merges.138  Or, per-
 
137. Section 365(n) applies only when the licensor of intellectual property is the 
bankrupt party.  See Brinson, supra note 131 (describing inadequacies of section 365(n) 
where licensee is the bankrupt party).  The Bankruptcy Code defines “intellectual prop-
erty” to include “(A) trade secret; (B) invention, process, design, or plant protected under 
Title 35; (C) patent application; (D) plant variety; (E) work of authorship protected under 
title 17; or (F) mask work protected under Chapter 9 of title 17.”  11 U.S.C. § 101(56).  
Interestingly enough, trademarks are excluded from the list. 
138. If the bank were a creditor of Merges, the bankrupt party, it could obtain ade-
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haps Bank’s interest will carry through to the damages recovered 
by Nimmer through the bankruptcy liquidation.139 
The problems for secured creditors, like Bank, are worse if the 
licensee Nimmer enters bankruptcy.  Because section 365(n) ap-
plies only to bankruptcy petitions filed by the licensor,140 section 
365(a) will apply,141 allowing Nimmer to reject unilaterally the 
franchising agreement, including both the copyright and the trade-
mark licenses.  The open question is the effect of the decision to 
reject on Bank’s security interest.  Bank may be able to enjoin 
Nimmer’s rejection because it would impair Bank’s interest in 
bankruptcy.142  If Bank can enjoin Nimmer, Bank’s status with re-
gards to Merges is unclear.  Bank may be able to liquidate its 
claims on Nimmer’s debt to some degree.  If Bank cannot enjoin 
Nimmer, however, Bank’s status with regards to Merges will also 
be unclear.  Although Merges would have a claim as an unsecured 
creditor should Nimmer choose to reject the contract, Bank’s status 
is unclear once Nimmer rejects the licenses that served as the 
source for Bank’s security interest. 
The primary problem is the conflict between property rights 
 
quate protection for its interests under section 362(d)(1), which allows the court to grant 
relief from the automatic stay.  Id. § 362(d)(1).  This provision, however, only applies to 
“a party in interest.”  Id.  Because the bank is a creditor of Nimmer in this hypothetical, it 
most likely will not be able to obtain adequate protection. 
139. The result will hinge upon the language of the security agreement.  The facts 
of this hypothetical are similar to those of In re Specialty Foods of Pittsburgh, 98 B.R. 
734 (1989).  In Specialty Foods, the secured creditor tried to assert its rights in the licen-
see-debtor’s “rights to payments” stemming from “general intangibles.”  Id.  The court 
held that the terms of the security agreement did not give the creditor any rights in the 
debtor’s license of a mark from the trademark licensor-owner because the creditor’s 
rights related only to “rights to payments.”  Id.  Because the licensee-debtor had an obli-
gation to make payments under the license, and no right to payments under the license, 
the creditor did not have a security interest in the license.  If the bank in the Nimmer-
Merges hypothetical had secured rights in Nimmer’s rights to payment stemming from 
the trademark license, the bank would probably have rights in any damage claims that 
Nimmer would have against Merges for breach.  The bank could protect its rights better 
by stating its rights in the trademark license more broadly, for example, by stating in the 
security agreement that its rights extended to “all Nimmer’s rights under any trademark.”  
See Clark, supra note 109, ¶ 1.08[1][G]. 
140. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1). 
141. Id. 
142. As a creditor of the debtor Nimmer, the bank is a party in interest and can ob-
tain adequate protection under section 362(d)(1).  Id. § 362(d)(1). 
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systems comprised of property rules and those comprised of liabil-
ity rules.  In a bankruptcy petition filed by the licensor, the licen-
see has property rule protection against the licensor, although the 
secured creditor of the licensee has only liability rule protection 
against the licensee.  It is uncertain what rights the secured creditor 
would have with regards to the licensor and how these rights 
would be protected.  Although the licensee has the right to exclude 
the licensor from the intellectual property, if the licensor files for 
bankruptcy, the secured creditor has the right to take the licensee’s 
property and pay for it.  The problem is that the licensee’s rights 
are derivative of the licensor’s rights and the licensee has greater 
protection of its rights than the secured creditor.  Questions arise 
regarding the level of protection that should be afforded to secured 
creditors and the proper means of providing such protection.  
Clearly, refining the system of recordation is not adequate. 
II. THE CHOICE BETWEEN PROPERTY RULES AND LIABILITY RULES 
AS APPLIED TO ATTACHMENT, PERFECTION, AND PRIORITY 
More than theoretical analysis informs the decision of whether 
property or liability rule protection is preferable, as transaction 
costs bear a significant impact on all of the models.  Further wrin-
kles are added when one considers trademarks and copyrights used 
as collateral.  This part explores the effect of transaction costs 
within property regime protections and considers the problems that 
inhere when intellectual property is used as collateral. 
A. Analyzing Property Regimes From a Transaction Costs 
Perspective 
The protection of property rights is determined in many in-
stances by politics rather than economics.143  For example, the 
compulsory license scheme under the Copyright Act for musical 
compositions, jukeboxes, cable television broadcasts, and public 
 
143. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 1-11 
(1991) (arguing that legislative enactments, whether regulatory or deregulatory, can be 
explained by competition among political interest groups); see also GARY D. LIBECAP, 
CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 1-9 (1989) (maintaining that property right systems 
result from particular institutional arrangements, and that contracting among rational par-
ties mitigates costs stemming from poor institutional design). 
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broadcasting resulted from political compromises.144  Similarly, in 
the current debate over the proper protection given to computer 
software, the battle rages over the appropriate remedy and the role 
of compulsory licenses.145  Although the distinctions drawn by the 
law often are the result of legislative compromise, rather than 
sound efficiency-minded planning, the economic implications of 
property rule versus liability rule protection filter into the debate. 
1. Overview: Transaction Costs Affect Property Rights 
Regimes 
The choice between property rules and liability rules is often 
framed in terms of the minimization of transaction costs.146  A le-
gal system of property rights must not only provide incentives for 
the creation of property, but must also permit the exchange of 
property through contract.147  This concern is in many ways the 
tension between the right to exclude and the right to access. 
A legal system should apply property rules and liability rules to 
facilitate transactions.  The usual prescription is that in low trans-
action cost environments, property rights should be protected by 
property rules.148  Because parties can bargain in low transaction 
 
144. See COPYRIGHT, PATENT, & TRADEMARK, supra note 3, at 599-604 (citing Paul 
Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: 
Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1107 (1977)). 
145. See COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, supra note 44, at 203-211.  See generally Wendy 
J. Gordon, Assertive Modesty: An Economics of Intangibles, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2579 
(1994); Peter S. Menell, The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual Property Protection 
for Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2644 (1994). 
146. Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed were the first authors to use the 
terminology of property rules and liability rules.  Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 22.  
Their analysis implicitly phrased the choice between the two rules in terms of the costs of 
transacting.  The formal linkage between protection of entitlements and the costs of 
transactions has become part of the folklore of law and economics analysis.  See Ayres & 
Balkin, supra note 18, at 704-06, nn.2-9. 
147. Ayres and Balkin maintain that: 
[T]he best argument for property rules and lower-order liability rules is that 
they create the right incentives for investment.  It is not, as many lawyer-
economists have assumed, that they create incentives for more efficient bar-
gains.  There is no reason to think that property rules are generally preferable 
to liability rules in the latter respect. 
Id. at 714. 
148. This axiom of law and economics has recently been questioned.  See id.; see 
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cost environments, the law should define property rights and pro-
tect them so that the rights can be transferred through purchases.  
There is, under a property rule, essentially no protection for the 
right to access, except to the extent that an individual can purchase 
that right from the holder of the property right. 
When transaction costs are high, however, liability rule protec-
tion is preferred.  Because it is very difficult for parties to bargain 
in high transaction cost environments, the legal system allows third 
parties to have access and pay for the access through a court or an 
agency-administered system.  The difficult issue is determining the 
exact price for the access.  The price may be market mimicking, 
namely, set at a level that would imitate a market negotiated price, 
or market facilitating, namely, set at a level that would allow the 
parties to bargain once the terms of the trade are fixed by law. 
In effect, transaction costs are like a wall around a medieval 
fortress.  If the wall is low, the fortress should be protected by a 
property rule that gives the owner the right to stave off the barbari-
ans except for the ones offering to pay to enter.  If the wall is high, 
the fortress should be protected by a liability rule that gives the 
barbarians the right to climb the wall and pay the guard afterwards.  
The open question is what determines the height, the thickness, 
and the penetrability of the wall. 
Transaction costs will significantly effect the type of wall pro-
tecting the fortress.  Transaction costs consist of three types of ex-
penses: (1) information costs arising from disparities in informa-
tion between the parties and the associated costs of acquiring the 
relevant information, (2) financing costs arising from differences 
in wealth that impose costs in acquiring the necessary funds with 
which to bargain, and (3) administrative costs which, very broadly, 
would consist of the costs of organizing and administering a legal 
system, as well as the legal and social costs of transacting to reach 
an agreed upon bargain.149  In different contexts, various dimen-
sions of transaction costs will arise in different manners and 
 
also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 113, at 93-100 (discussing the conventional wisdom of 
the rule).  But see A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 
15-24 (1989) (criticizing the rule); Ayres & Balkin, supra note 18, at 706 n.11 (same). 
149. Cf. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 113, at 84-89 (classifying transaction costs as 
search costs, bargaining costs, or enforcement costs). 
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amounts.  The key to the economic analysis of property rights is to 
assess the costs and prescribe the desired level and type of protec-
tion. 
The distinction between property rules and liability rules has 
been the subject of heated academic debate recently.150  The debate 
has focused on the bargaining game that actors play in resolving 
disputes and determining the strategies available to the courts 
seeking efficient bargaining.151  In light of this research, property 
rules and liability rules are “morphed,” resulting in the creation of 
a new category of remedies.152  Ayres and Balkin refer to the new 
general category of remedies as “auctions,” meaning that bargain-
ing in the shadow of the legal regime can best be understood as a 
search for the highest value attainable for legal entitlements.  A 
particular property rights regime, with its allocation of rights and 
system of entitlement protection, creates a system in which parties 
can bid by exercising their respective options to take and pay or to 
exclude, until the entitlement is in the hands of the party that is 
willing to bid the highest for it.  The characterization of legal enti-
tlements as auctions brings the Coase Theorem back full circle to 
its roots in the economic problem of externalities.153 
In the neo-classical, Arrow-Debreu model of the economy, ex-
ternalities arise when there are spillovers from the underlying tech-
 
150. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 22, at 1106-10; Merges, supra note 23, 
at 2664; see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: 
An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996). 
151. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Enti-
tlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1051 (1995) (demonstrating 
that efficient bargaining can be promoted by split entitlements and liability rules when 
parties have asymmetric information).  Many commentators have contributed to the de-
bate.  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargain-
ing? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995) (offering counter examples 
to Ayres and Talley showing that most efficiency gains of liability rules stem from non-
consensual benefits of liability rules); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property 
Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (1995) 
(arguing that the four possible rules found in Calabresi and Melamed too narrowly cap-
ture range of strategies available to courts). 
152. Or in the current academic vernacular, the dichotomy between property rules 
and liability rules has been deconstructed.  See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 18, at 705. 
153. See RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, 
PUBLIC GOODS & CLUB GOODS 39-67 (1996). 
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technology or preferences in the economy.154  Externalities create 
problems in the market’s ability to allocate resources efficiently.  
One solution is the Pigovian tax, otherwise referred to as the sub-
sidy solution, which requires detailed centralized information 
about technologies and preferences in order to set the correct 
price.155  Another possibility is the Coasean decentralized solution, 
which characterized the externality problem as one of unallocated 
property rights.156  Both solutions build on the insight that exter-
nalities pose problems for market economies because the econo-
mies lack the markets necessary to allocate the costs and benefits 
of the externality.157  The Pigovian solution resolves the problem 
through state planning.158  A Coasean auction solution, as de-
scribed by Ayres and Balkin, uses the legal system to supply the 
missing market through which the legal entitlement is allocated to 
the highest bidder.159 
2. Transaction Costs in Trademark and Copyright 
The entitlement structures of trademark and copyright, when 
examined from a transaction costs perspective, are quite informa-
tive.  The provisions of the Lanham Act illustrate the analysis.  
Under the Lanham Act, the trademark owner can seek an injunc-
tion and an accounting of profits from the infringer; the infringer 
cannot take and pay.160  Property rule protection for the trademark 
owner makes sense in light of the goals of the Lanham Act. 
As a trademark is designed to denote the quality and source of 
the product bearing the mark, limiting access is important.  Fur-
thermore, access should be limited in accordance with the stan-
dards of the trademark owner who has used the mark to convey 
specific information about quality in the marketplace.  By allowing 
third parties to obtain access to use the mark only through pur-
chase, the law allows the trademark owner control the manner in 
 
154. See id. 
155. See id. 
156. See id. 
157. See id. 
158. See id. 
159. See id. 
160. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1176(2), 1116(d)(1)(A) (1994). 
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which the mark is used.  If third parties could take and pay, access 
would expand at the expense of the information conveyed by use 
of the mark. 
A liability rule would further be undesirable because of valua-
tion problems.  The value of the mark will differ based on the geo-
graphic region in which the mark is used and the product on which 
it is used.  Because of these complicated valuation issues, a court 
or agency administered determination of damages will be more 
costly than a privately negotiated price.  Furthermore, because of 
the recordation system, individuals seeking to purchase use of the 
mark can determine whom to contact for permission.  Finally, 
trademark owners have the incentive to franchise use of the mark 
to third parties in order to facilitate the distribution of the product 
bearing the trademark. 
Under the Copyright Act, the nature of the product complicates 
the balance between exclusion and access.  Cable television broad-
casts, as noted above, are protected through compulsory licenses.  
This protection can be justified by the greater need for access and 
the lesser incentive required to produce works, such as news 
broadcasts.  The value of news depreciates quickly; a system in 
which the copyright owner can enjoin use of news broadcasts 
would impede the flow of information and raise transaction costs 
for the purchase of information.161 
Although this rationale justifies a compulsory license system 
for news, from a consumer perspective, the rationale is weaker for 
the transmission of works of entertainment.  Made-for-television 
movies are similar to novels, which are protected by a property 
rule requiring users of the material in a novel to obtain and often 
purchase the permission from the owner.162  The need for and the 
gains from access are lower for entertainment works than for news, 
yet in the context of cable broadcasts, both are protected by the li-
ability rule through a compulsory license system. 
 
161. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that there is no general right to forbid others from repeat-
ing uncopyrighted information). 
162. See generally Susan C. Portin, Pay TV—Piracy and the Law: It’s Time to 
Clear Up the Confusion, 33 EMORY L.J. 825, 832 (1984) (discussing copyright issues re-
lating to “Pay TV”). 
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There are two economic rationales for this treatment.  First, 
given the low cost of transmitting works through cable television 
to a wide audience, requiring a court or agency determination of 
what is news and what is entertainment would raise transaction 
costs.  Therefore, the simplest treatment is to make no distinctions 
between news and other broadcasts.  Second, broadcast television 
and advertisers actually benefit from the rule requiring compulsory 
licenses for cable rebroadcasts of broadcast television.  Because of 
the wider audience, advertisers benefit from the rule, as do broad-
cast networks which can charge higher rates for advertising, part of 
which would be subsidized by the compulsory license.163 
3. Transaction Costs in Secured Credit 
Transaction costs also play a role in the protection of debtor 
and creditor rights in the context of secured credit.  The credit rela-
tionship between the debtor and the creditor is essentially a con-
tractual one, involving an exchange of promises protected by con-
tract law.  The unique problem with a contract for debt is one of 
monitoring.  If the debtor’s sole promise is to repay the money 
given by the creditor sometime in the future, the creditor must ex-
pend resources to make sure that the debtor does not become in-
solvent and unable to fulfill the contractual obligations. 
Although all contracts require monitoring, the monitoring costs 
are potentially quite high in the context of a debt contract because 
of the risks involved; a creditor will often be financing a new busi-
 
163. The treatment of cable broadcasts contrasts with the proposed compulsory li-
cense treatment for computer software.  The need for access to computer software serves 
as the basis for arguments in favor of compulsory license protection for copyright owners 
of computer software.  Because of widespread use and rapid development, access is es-
sential; especially to those who seek to reverse engineer new programs and improve ex-
isting programs.  Property rule protection would prohibit access.  Proponents of property 
rule protection note the ability of the industry to regulate itself through the use of clear-
inghouses and private licensing agencies.  Without property rule protection, proponents 
argue that incentives to create software would diminish.  Both sides, however, overlook 
the fact that the software industry developed without copyright protection through the 
1970s and 1980s, and that the market provides the basis for much of the incentive to cre-
ate and innovate software.  See generally Menell, supra note 145 (analyzing legal enti-
tlements for software innovations in light of possible market failures and potential legis-
lative obstacles); Merges, supra note 23, at 2662-63 (encouraging use of industry 
enforcement technology). 
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ness venture whose success will depend upon the debtor’s efforts 
and exogenous factors, such as the state of the marketplace.  Se-
cured credit ideally is designed to lower monitoring costs by giv-
ing the secured creditor an interest in the assets of the debtor.  If 
the debtor defaults, then the secured creditor has the right to re-
cover on the debt contract by obtaining a judicial lien against that 
portion of the debtor’s assets used as collateral.  As a result, the 
creditor can insure a part of the risk borne by his loan to the 
debtor.164 
Moreover, the creditor’s interest in the debtor’s assets is pro-
tected by a mixed property-liability rule: The right to liquidate the 
assets and obtain some payment—possibly much less than the 
value of the debt—from sale of the assets.  Full property rule pro-
tection would allow the creditor to obtain the full value of the 
debtor’s obligations, even if the value of the collateral was less 
than the debt.  Under property rule protection for the creditor, the 
debtor would bear the full risk of default and the creditor would 
have little or no incentive to monitor the debtor.  By according a 
mixed property-liability rule protection to the creditor, the law 
passes some of the risk of default to the creditor with the attendant 
requirements of monitoring.165  The net result is a system that 
 
164. Secured debt can be issued with a lower risk premium than unsecured debt, 
thereby reflecting the lower risk involved because of the creditor’s security interest in the 
debtor’s assets.  See Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1067, 1085-87, 1125-29 (1989) (showing that risk premiums are lower 
for secured creditors).  See Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Fi-
nancing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979), for an analysis of the 
monitoring role played by secured credit.  See Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in 
Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 49-50 (1982) (arguing that secured 
credit with priority can lower monitoring costs and prevent asset substitution); see also 
GAME THEORY, supra note 125, at 195-202 (analyzing the problems associated with 
monitoring costs); Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common 
Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 645 (1992) (describing the effect of secured credit on monitor-
ing costs); James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 
VAND. L. REV. 473, 491-94 (1984) (arguing that secured credit reduces risk aversion by 
creditors and that unsecured creditors benefit from monitoring performed by secured 
creditors and therefore have a lesser need for a risk premium). 
165. If the secured creditor were fully insured, there would be no incentive to moni-
tor the debtor—thus undercutting the arguments that secured credit benefits both the se-
cured and unsecured creditors of the debtor.  See supra note 164.  By offering less than 
full property protection, the secured creditor is forced to monitor the debtor to avoid asset 
substitution, for example, or to ensure that the collateral is not being wasted.  See Ken-
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avoids the moral hazard166 created by full insurance against de-
fault, and accords the creditor and the debtor the flexibility to 
transact over the course of the debt.167 
The divided ownership problem in the secured credit context 
poses difficulties for other creditors of the debtor.  Although part 
of the problem, resulting from the separation of possession and 
ownership noted in Benedict v. Ratner, is alleviated through a re-
cording system, secured credit arrangements may increase the 
overall cost of using debt to finance ventures.  Secured credit, 
however, reduces the cost of obtaining debt from secured creditors 
because such creditors will agree to a lower rate of interest in ex-
change for a security interest.  The debtor can use the same collat-
eral to secure debt from other creditors, who will raise the interest 
on the debt to reflect the fact that another secured creditor has an 
interest in the collateral.  Secured creditors rights in regard to each 
other are protected through property rules.168 
Nevertheless, the use of security may raise the costs of unse-
cured credit.169  Unsecured creditors’ rights are protected through 
 
neth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS:  THE STRUCTURE 
OF BUSINESS 37, 38-39 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds. 1991) (illustrating 
the effects of insurance on hidden actions by insured party). 
166. “Moral hazard” is defined as: 
In fire insurance, the risk or danger of the destruction of the insured property 
by fire, as measured by the character and interest of the insured owner, his hab-
its as a prudent and careful man or the reverse, his known integrity or his bad 
reputation, and the amount of loss he would suffer by the destruction of the 
property or the gain he would make by suffering it to burn and collecting the 
insurance. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (6th ed. 1990). 
167. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 18 (concluding that choice between property 
rules and liability rules is more about creating proper incentives for investment than 
about facilitating bargaining). 
168. See GAME THEORY, supra note 125 (demonstrating analytically necessity of 
priority to ensure monitoring behavior by secured creditors); Picker, supra note 164. 
169. See Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of 
Current Theories, 10 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 7-9 (1981) (questioning efficiency gains of secured 
credit on grounds that security interests are a transfer from unsecured to secured credi-
tors); see also Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 
1051, 1068 (1984) (suggesting that “answers to the secured debt puzzle are less likely to 
be found in simple notions that ‘security interests reduce risk’ than in careful analyses of 
the differing preferences for security among debtors and creditors”).  Professor 
Schwartz’s critique is based largely on the Modigliani-Miller Theorem (“Theorem”), 
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contract and a tangled mix of property and liability rules.  Al-
though unsecured creditors are exposed to the risk of the debtor 
entering bankruptcy, in which the obligations to unsecured credi-
tors would be liquidated at much less than the value of the claims, 
an unsecured creditor has the right, prior to bankruptcy, to obtain a 
judicial lien against the debtor’s assets and become a lien creditor.  
A lien creditor has in many ways the status of a secured creditor, 
especially in obtaining the priority of his claims against the debtor 
over subsequent secured creditors with unperfected interests.  Al-
though lien creditors lack security for their loans, the monitoring 
costs of unsecured debt may be lower because of the creditor’s 
ability to transform his interest from one that is unprotected, vis-à-
vis other creditors, to one that is protected through a property 
rule.170 
Property rule protection for the rights of creditors, toward each 
other, almost certainly lowers the transaction costs of debt financ-
ing.171  If creditors could “take and pay,” that is, recover the debt 
from the debtor’s assets and compensate other creditors for the 
loss, the transaction costs of debt financing would increase.  Ad-
ministrative costs would rise as the court determined the costs as-
sociated with each creditor’s interests by the “taking” creditor.  
Furthermore, information costs would increase because creditors 
would face the uncertainty of not knowing which creditor will act 
first to take from the debtor’s assets.  Under a property rule re-
gime, creditors can purchase priority rights from other creditors 
 
which states that in a world of perfect competition, a company’s debt/equity ratio does 
not affect the company’s value.  The Theorem applies not only to the choice between 
debt and equity but also to the choice among different types of debt.  See Franco Modi-
gliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of 
Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).  See Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solu-
tion to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 77-89 (1993), for one re-
sponse to Professor Schwartz’s arguments that resolves the bankruptcy priority puzzle. 
170. There is a parallel between secured credit and unsecured credit that has not 
been formally explored.  See Theodore Eisenberg, The Undersecured Creditor, in Reor-
ganization and the Nature of Security, 38 VAND. L. REV. 931, 960-63 (stating that “the 
difference between secured and unsecured forms of debt is more one of degree than of 
kind”); see also George Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Informa-
tion, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 225, 255-58 (analyzing how secured debt can affect both agency 
costs and signaling costs). 
171. See Adler, supra note 169; Picker, supra note 128. 
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and restructure the priority determined by state law.  Because 
creditors are usually sophisticated players, the bargaining costs are 
lower in resolving priority disputes through property rules, rather 
than liability rules.172 
B. Analysis of Trademarks and Copyrights as Collateral 
The rationales behind the choice between a property rule and a 
liability rule, when copyrights and trademarks are used as collat-
eral, are integral to understanding the resulting problems.  In terms 
of obtaining priority among creditors in settling claims against the 
debtor, the issue is one of certainty and proper notice under the 
current system of priority.  When a secured creditor has an interest 
in a copyright or in a trademark, it is uncertain where the creditor 
must file his interest in order to perfect and obtain priority.  The 
current law can be divided into three categories: (1) a dual system 
for copyrights and trademarks, (2) a “belt and suspenders” ap-
proach, and (3) a veil of ignorance approach.  Each of these sys-
tems undermines the balance between property and liability rules 
in the current system of secured credit and intellectual property. 
1. Current Law and Problems 
The dual system was created by In re Peregrine Entertainment 
Ltd.173 and In re Joseph v. 1200 Valencia, Inc.,174 two California 
bankruptcy decisions which held that security interests in a copy-
right can be perfected only by a federal filing with the Copyright 
Office and security interests in a trademark can be perfected only 
by an appropriate state filing.  The reasoning behind these two 
opinions rests on section 205 of the Copyright Act and section 10 
of the Lanham Act.  Both provisions deal with priority disputes 
among subsequent assignees of the copyright or trademark.  In ad-
dition, both sections impose recording obligations on the assignee 
 
172. This is consistent with the view that “[b]ankruptcy law creates a bargaining 
environment in which Creditor and Manager negotiate with each other.”  GAME THEORY, 
supra note 125, at 233; see also Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Nonco-
operative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 311 
(1991). 
173. 116 B.R. 194 (1990). 
174. 137 B.R. 778 (1992). 
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to record the assignment at the federal level. 
The provisions differ in one fundamental way; the Lanham Act 
applies solely to assignments, namely, contractual transfers of title, 
while the Copyright Act applies to assignments and transfers, the 
latter constituting transfers of rights that do not involve transfers of 
title.  The Bankruptcy Court in California has read “transfer” under 
the Copyright Act to include transfers of security interests.175  As a 
result, security interests are governed by the Copyright Act, but not 
the Lanham Act.  Furthermore, because of the doctrine of implied 
preemption,176 the need to record the transfer of a security interest 
under the Copyright Act preempts state law requirements.177 
This interpretation of the Lanham and Copyright Acts not only 
creates a dual system for copyrights and trademarks, but also in-
troduces several lacunae in the law.  First, priority disputes among 
assignees under the Lanham Act are resolved through a first to file 
rule.  This rule, however, does not address disputes between se-
cured creditors and assignees.178  As previously discussed, this gap 
 
175. See Peregrine, 116 B.R. at 204 n.14. 
176. See generally Lydia A. Nayo, Revisiting Worth: The Copyright as Community 
Property Problem, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 153, 162 (1992) (describing the application of the 
doctrine of implied preemption).  According to one commentator: 
Under the doctrine of implied preemption, where a federal statute does not ex-
pressly prohibit application of state law to the federal benefit generated by the 
statute, preemption is implied to the extent that application of the state scheme 
does “major damage” to a “clear and substantial” interest in the federal legisla-
tion. 
Id. (citing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979); City of Burbank v. Lockheed 
Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973)). 
177. The court in Peregrine noted that although: 
 The Copyright Act [under section 301] does expressly preempt state law in 
respect to the exclusive rights possessed by holders of copyright under federal 
law. . . . 
 Section 301 is inapplicable because here we are concerned not with the crea-
tion of the exclusive rights under section 106, but rather their transfer through 
the creation of a security interest. 
116 B.R. at 199 n.6 (citations omitted).  The court, however, did base its decision on the 
policy goals underlying the Copyright Act of “predictability and certainty of copyright 
ownership” and the need to “avoid the practical difficulties of determining and enforcing 
an author’s rights under the differing laws and in the separate courts of the various 
States.”  Id. at 199 (citing Committee for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 
(1989)). 
178. See Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 109, at 124-25 (recommending the 
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is a problem under bankruptcy law.  Second, although the Copy-
right Act adopts a first to file rule that would apply to licensees 
and transferees, the Copyright Act also has special timing rules 
that give transferees up to three months to file against subsequent 
transferees or licensees.179  From the perspective of a secured 
creditor, the timing and federal filing rules adds uncertainty to the 
process of entering into secured credit arrangements.  Because fed-
eral filing occurs on the basis of title and registration number, 
whereas state filings are based on the debtor’s legal name, the se-
cured creditor will find it more difficult to determine the priority of 
claims under federal law than under state law.180 
The dual system of filing for copyrights and trademarks in-
creases the cost for secured credit.  The problem is exacerbated by 
the fact that the same item often can be protected by both copy-
right and trademark laws.  In many instances, copyright and 
trademark may blend into each other and the dual system may ef-
fectively turn into a “belt and suspenders” approach, whereby the 
secured creditor makes both a state and a federal filing, increasing 
the transaction costs of secured credit. 
Even if the legal cost of duplicative filings is low, a dual filing 
system may not provide adequate protection for several reasons.  
First, there are the potential preemption issues.  If a court finds that 
a copyright filing preempts the state filing, leading to a different 
result as to priority, the protection of the law is lost.  Furthermore, 
the timing rules for filing differ between state and federal laws, 
adding confusion with regard to the determination of priority. 
The lack of awareness of these issues also creates confusion 
over how to perfect security interests in copyrights and trademarks.  
Many practitioners do not even know of the possible need to con-
sider federal law.181  As a result, copyrights and trademarks are 
 
application of a first in time rule to resolve disputes). 
179. See 15 U.S.C. § 205(c) (1994). 
180. See Haemmerli, supra note 11, at 1723-29; see also Weinberg & Woodward, 
supra note 109, at 79-92 (discussing the difficulty in determining the priority of claims). 
181. This confusion is evidenced by the court’s decision in Roman Cleanser.  See 
discussion supra note 100 (quoting Roman Cleanser court’s opinion regarding confusion 
in filing). 
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treated like general intangibles,182 and interests are perfected ac-
cordingly.183  The implications are that many security interests in 
copyrights and trademarks are never perfected, exposing secured 
creditors to the risk that their interests may be trumped by other 
creditors or converted to unsecured debt in bankruptcy. 
2. Critique of the Federal Filing System as a Potential 
Remedy 
One remedy to the confusion over where to file interests in 
copyrights and trademarks is a federal filing system, embracing all 
intellectual property interests.  This proposal needlessly increases 
the costs of secured credit without addressing the issues raised by 
intellectual property.  A system of federal filing creates conflicts 
between the Copyright Office and the P.T.O. over the appropriate 
place to file security interests and increases the administrative bur-
den.184  A federal system also increases the search costs for credi-
tors attempting to establish priority.185  More importantly, a federal 
system will not resolve the problems faced by secured creditors 
with interests in trademarks and copyrights in bankruptcy. 
Proponents of a federal system analogize copyrights and 
trademarks to the treatment of government licenses, such as Fed-
eral Aviation Administration certificates or Federal Communica-
tions Commission licenses, under article 9.186  Unlike its treatment 
 
182. See U.C.C. § 9-106 (1995) (defining “general intangibles”). 
183. See id. § 9-302(1) (providing rules for perfecting security interests in general 
intangibles); see also id. § 9-401 (setting out rules for location of filing). 
184. Some reform proposals circumvent this problem by creating a separate federal 
agency for governing the filing of security interests in trademarks and copyrights.  See 
Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 109, at 79-84. 
185. Currently, the problems are exacerbated because registrations of security inter-
ests under state law are under the debtor’s name, while registrations of trademarks and 
copyrights are under the name of the protected work or mark. 
186. See G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., 958 F.2d 896, 905 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (finding that allowing individual state recording requirements to control would 
have impermissibly conflicted with goal of uniformity, and holding that Supplemental 
Type Certificates issued by Federal Aviation Administration are property) (citing In re 
Peregrine, 116 B.R. 194 (1990)).  Article 9 “does not apply to a security interest subject 
to any statute of the United States to the extent that such statute governs the rights of par-
ties to and third parties affected by transactions in particular types of property.”  U.C.C. 
§ 9-104(a). 
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of federal licenses, article 9 does not mandate federal filing for 
copyrights and trademarks.187  A federal filing requirement for 
copyrights and trademarks would be permitted under article 9, but 
the rationale would differ from the mandatory requirement for li-
censes, which are wholly the creation of the federal government. 
Copyrights and trademarks are federal property rights of a dif-
ferent sort because they are rights that also have a large state or lo-
cal component.  A trademark, for example, must first be developed 
in local markets and used in interstate commerce before federal 
protection attaches.  A federal property right under copyright is 
created as soon as a work is placed in a tangible medium of ex-
pression, but the same work may be protected by state law, includ-
ing state trade secret law.  Furthermore, rights under both trade-
mark and copyright can be transferred through contract.  
Therefore, unlike government licenses, trademarks and copyrights 
also embody a slew of state rights. 
Federal involvement in the creation of trademarks and copy-
rights is not a sufficient justification for creating a federal recorda-
tion system.  The purpose of recording security interests is for a 
secured creditor to establish property rights against other creditors.  
Unless there is a compelling federal interest for federal recording, 
as there is for federal licenses, no special need calls for a separate 
system for recording security interests in copyrights and trade-
marks. 
Arguably, one compelling reason for a federal system is the 
language of the Copyright Act that requires the filing of transfers 
 
187. Article 9 provides that state filings are not effective if there is an adequate sys-
tem of filing, either state or federal, outside article 9.  Id. § 9-302(3).  If such a system 
exists, then perfection can occur only through a filing under the alternative system.  See 
id. § 9-302(4).  Deciding whether a federal scheme for registering copyrights and trade-
marks is adequate is crucial for determining whether article 9 mandates a federal filing.  
The Peregrine court maintained that a federal filing scheme is adequate.  See supra note 
97 (citing Peregrine).  The Peregrine court, however, also stated that the federal filing 
system did not preempt the state system.  Contrast the court’s decision in Joseph, where 
it held that a federal system for trademark filing was not adequate because section 1060 
of the Lanham Act applied only to assignments.  In re Joseph, 137 B.R. 778, 778 (1992).  
The Joseph court seemingly ignored or underplayed the uniformity goals of trademark 
law.  Because there is no preemption of state law regarding security interests by either 
the Copyright Act or the Lanham Act, it is unclear whether a federal filing is required.  
See id. 
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of copyrights.  This reference to transfers, however, is not designed 
to preempt state filing systems.  Therefore, the filing requirement 
under the Copyright Act should not be read as a substitute for, or 
an additional requirement to, the state filing which is necessary for 
a secured creditor to preserve his right against other creditors.  The 
filing requirement under the Copyright Act, however, is needed for 
the secured creditor to preserve his rights against subsequent as-
signees. 
In contrast, the Lanham Act is silent on how a secured creditor 
can preserve his rights.  Although the Lanham Act does not require 
a federal filing of security interests by secured creditors, it does 
create a system for allocating rights among assignees.188  The 
Lanham Act and state law are silent on how to resolve conflicts be-
tween secured creditors and assignees.  Because of such gaps, 
which become even wider in bankruptcy, the creation of a federal 
system of filing is not by itself an adequate means to resolve the 
problems of secured credit in intellectual property. 
III. HOW AND WHY BANKRUPTCY LAW TRANSFORMS LIABILITY 
RULES INTO PROPERTY RULES 
Bankruptcy is a procedural device through which a debtor can 
restructure his contractual rights against the rest of the world.  The 
restructuring can occur either through a reorganization plan or 
through liquidation and discharge.189  Part of the bankruptcy pro-
cedure entails establishing the scope and the value of the debtor’s 
estate, which will serve as the basis for determining the restructur-
ing or liquidation.  In providing rules for assembling the debtor’s 
estate, the Bankruptcy Code helps to establish the debtor’s prop-
erty rights in various assets that comprise the estate, including con-
 
188. See Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 109 (suggesting a proposal for resolv-
ing disputes). 
189. These options represent the “fresh start” rationale for bankruptcy law.  As one 
author has put it, “the belief that the right to a fresh start should not be waivable may re-
sult from a recognition of two distinct problems—the effects that our financial misfor-
tunes might have on others and our own inability to assess risks correctly at the time we 
borrow.”  GAME THEORY, supra note 125, at 35.  See GAME THEORY, supra note 125, at 
17-19, for a comparison of liquidation proceedings under chapter 7 and reorganizations 
under chapter 11. 
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tractual obligations.190  The reorganization or liquidation phase of 
bankruptcy allows the debtor to settle various claims against third 
parties.191  Because of this two part nature of bankruptcy proce-
dure, the Bankruptcy Code is comprised in of both property and 
liability rules.192 
 
190. Under 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(1), the trustee is given “all legal or equitable inter-
ests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”  Id.  In addition, 
there are many issues surrounding the assembly of the bankruptcy estate.  See GAME 
THEORY, supra note 125, at 94-100; see also LOGIC & LIMITS, supra note 119, at 89-104 
(stating that determining which assets are included within an estate rests on asking 
whether the estate is “more valuable with the item under consideration than without it”). 
191. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the 
Creditors’ Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 893-95 (1981) (exploring similarities between liq-
uidation and reorganization).  The bankruptcy process, whether in the form of liquidation 
or reorganization, aims to settle claims while allowing the debtor to continue as a going 
concern.  This goal underlays the broader goal of providing the debtor with a fresh start.  
The fresh start rationale is coincidental to the monitoring goals of bankruptcy and of en-
suring creditors of the financial health of the debtor.  See GAME THEORY, supra note 125, 
at 15 (“[T]he bankruptcy process can offer scrutiny of the debtor’s overall health that no 
individual creditor can match.”). 
192. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 
85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 949-50 (1985).  According to one commentator: 
[M]odified property rules have been imposed on people who are either insol-
vent or about to die.  In both cases, these rules solve problems that arise be-
cause someone with an interest in the property has no formal legal claim until 
some event, i.e. bankruptcy or death occurs . . . .  The modified property rule is 
a second-best way of recognizing the property interests of creditors, heirs, and 
tax collectors in situations where the nominal owner may choose to overlook 
their claims. 
Id.; see also Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 
847 (1993) (generalizing Calabresi-Melamed typology to cover sixteen types of property 
entitlements).  The distinctive roles of property and liability rules can also be seen in the 
substantive differences between liquidation and reorganization.  See Jackson, supra note 
191, at 896.  “Normally in a liquidation under Chapter 7, the assets are sold off and the 
‘debtor’ is effectively removed from the picture.  Third parties are almost certainly in-
volved as ‘owners’ if not as managers.  The essence of a reorganization, however, is that 
third parties are not involved.”  Id.  Bankruptcy default rules limit the ability to contract 
out and are, in effect, property-like in application.  “The benefits of standardized distri-
butional rules suggest that the traditional contractual freedom to opt out of the creditors 
bargain might sensibly be restricted in bankruptcy.  Bankruptcy law is neither a pure 
contractarian nor a strictly regulatory legal regime.”  Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. 
Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ 
Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155, 203 (1989). 
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A. The Bankruptcy Code Transforms Liability Rules Into 
Property Rules 
In addition to containing both property and liability rules, the 
Bankruptcy Code transforms liability rules into property rules.  
This section provides an overview of the transformation, followed 
by more detailed investigations of sections 365(a) and 365(n). 
1. Overview of the Transformation 
Some provisions of the Bankruptcy Code meld both property 
rules and liability rules.  Section 365,193 which concerns the as-
sumption or rejection of executory contracts, is one example of this 
mixed regime.  Under section 365, in managing the debtor’s estate 
for the benefit of the creditors, the trustee can elect to either as-
sume or reject ongoing contractual obligations of the debtor which 
are “executory” in nature.  There is a vast amount of literature de-
voted to the meaning of “executoriness” and many courts apply a 
test of “executoriness” before applying section 365.194  This Arti-
cle adopts the Countryman definition that, a contract is executory 
if performance obligations are outstanding on both sides of the 
contract.195 
The mixed property rule-liability rule nature of section 365 is 
exemplified by understanding the principal purposes behind the 
provision.  The trustee’s authority to either assume or reject an ex-
ecutory contract is consistent with her authority to assemble the 
debtor’s estate.  By asserting the debtor’s rights through assump-
 
193. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365 (1997). 
194. The classic definition of “executory contract” is “a contract under which the 
obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed 
that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach ex-
cusing the performance of the other.”  Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bank-
ruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973).  This definition of executory contracts 
has been adopted by almost all bankruptcy courts as a prerequisite for the application of 
section 365.  See Jordan & Warren, supra note 121, at 316.  Nevertheless, some com-
mentators have criticized the application of this definition as a prerequisite for section 
365.  See Westbrook, supra note 125, at 243; see also Michael Andrew, Executory Con-
tracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding ‘Rejection’, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845 (1988); Mi-
chael Andrew, Executory Contracts Revisited: A Reply to Professor Westbrook, 62 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
195. See Countryman, supra note 194, at 460. 
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tion of contracts that are profitable to the estate and rejection of 
contracts that are not profitable, the trustee furthers the goal of 
maximizing the value of the debtor’s estate.  In rejecting the un-
profitable contractual obligations, however, the trustee gives third 
parties claims to be liquidated in bankruptcy.  As a result, section 
365 creates a mixed property rule-liability rule regime, within 
which the trustee can seek performance of obligations that increase 
the value of the estate and liquidate claims that do not.196 
Application of section 365 is particularly confusing, especially 
in the intellectual property context, because its provisions trans-
form what would be liability rules in the non-bankruptcy setting 
into property rules under bankruptcy.  If the choice between prop-
erty and liability rules is based solely on transaction costs, then the 
transformation within bankruptcy may make sense.  Transaction 
costs are lower within bankruptcy because negotiations among the 
trustee and creditors are orchestrated by the court and choreo-
graphed by detailed rules.  The problem is that bankruptcy law of-
ten affects bargaining that occurs outside of bankruptcy.197  Fur-
thermore, it is likely that bankruptcy law transforms the nature and 
source of transaction costs, instead of eliminating them.  Each of 
these points is illustrated by the bankruptcy treatment of intellec-
tual property under section 365. 
Indicative of how bankruptcy law alters non-bankruptcy con-
tractual and property relations is the definition of intellectual prop-
erty under the Bankruptcy Code.198  Although copyrights are intel-
lectual property under the Bankruptcy Code, trademarks are not.199  
The exclusion of trademarks is as much about legislative compro-
mise as it is about respecting the goals of trademark law.200  Be-
 
196. See GAME THEORY, supra note 125, at 116; Westbrook, supra note 125. 
197. See GAME THEORY, supra note 125, at 232-37; see also Jackson, supra note 
191, at 907 (“[W]e would be better able to formulate and apply principled bankruptcy 
rules if we would give systematic and critical attention to the impact of those rules on 
non-bankruptcy entitlements.”). 
198. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(56). 
199. Id. 
200. One commentator stated that: 
The exclusion of trademarks from the definition of intellectual property 
stemmed from “Congress’s” concern . . . centered around new and unproven 
start-up companies in the computer software and biotechnology industries, 
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cause of the exclusion, separate rules govern trademarks and copy-
rights under section 365.  Consequently, section 365(n) deals spe-
cifically with licenses of intellectual property when the licensor is 
bankrupt.  As a result, the rules change depending upon whether 
the bankrupt party is the licensor or the licensee of intellectual 
property.  Quite simply, trademarks and licensee bankruptcy are 
governed by what this Article refers to as the “365(a) regime.”  
Bankruptcy by licensors of non-trademark intellectual property is 
governed by what the “365(n) regime.” 
2. The 365(a) Regime 
Under the 365(a) regime, the trustee can either assume or reject 
the debtor’s contractual obligations.  The choice of assumption by 
the trustee corresponds to property rule protection for the debtor’s 
contractual rights; the debtor can seek specific performance on the 
contract.  If the third party breaches, the debtor will have a claim 
for contractual breach, which will be an asset of the debtor’s es-
tate.  If the trustee chooses to reject the contract instead, the third 
party will have a claim for breach of contract against the debtor’s 
estate, which will be treated as an unsecured claim.  Assumption 
and rejection together correspond to property-like protection for 
the debtor’s rights because the third party’s claim for breach, in the 
event of rejection, will be for substantially less than the full 
amount of contractual damages.201 
 
which were heavily dependent on licensing . . . .  [T]he primary purpose of the 
amendment was to protect technology licensing; . . . the legislative history in-
dicates that Congress specifically did not intend, by amending § 365, to “bring 
every retail franchise involving a trademark within the purview of the legisla-
tion, thus extending the reach of the bill far beyond what appears necessary.” 
Stuart M. Riback, The Interface of Trademarks and Bankruptcy, 6 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, 
6 (1994) (citations omitted); see also Stuart M. Riback, Are Trademarks Intellectual 
Property in Bankruptcy? Maybe, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 1994, at 1. 
201. See Westbrook, supra note 125 (pointing out that upon rejection, the debtor 
will have to pay damages on the executory contract in “bankruptcy dollars,” i.e., at a re-
duced portion of the amount of damages).  The difference between liability rules and 
property rules is one of degree rather than of kind: 
[T]he only difference between liability and property rules is the price of exer-
cising the option—the damages to be paid for the non-consensual taking.  
Property rules set the exercise price so high that no one is likely to exercise the 
option to take nonconsensually, while the lower exercise prices of liability 
rules presuppose that some people will take nonconsensually. 
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In many instances, the 365(a) regime alters the corresponding 
non-bankruptcy regime.  For example, if a trademark owner in the 
mark “NoBorders” licenses the right to use the mark as part of a 
franchise and enters into bankruptcy, under section 365(a), the 
trademark owner has the right to reject the franchise agreement 
and enjoin the franchisee from use of the mark.202  The property 
rule protection, under bankruptcy, corresponds to the property rule 
protection for the trademark owner’s rights in the mark under the 
Lanham Act.  If the franchisee files for bankruptcy, however, the 
franchisee can assume the contract and continue using the mark, 
essentially enjoining the franchisor from denying access to the 
mark.  Under non-bankruptcy law, the franchisee’s rights are pro-
tected solely by contract law; if the franchisor denied access or 
breached the franchise agreement, the franchisee would have a 
claim for damages against the franchisor.  In bankruptcy, the fran-
chisee can obtain the equivalent of specific performance.203 
The rights of franchisees and franchisors under section 365 are 
also affected by security interests in the mark.  If a bank, for ex-
ample, has a security interest in the mark, the bank can seek ade-
quate protection for its rights in the mark in the event of rejection 
by the trustee.  If the franchisor files for bankruptcy and rejects the 
franchise, a bank with a security interest in the mark can petition 
the court for adequate protection of its rights in the mark.204 
 
Ayres & Balkin, supra note 18, at 705.  In the executory contract context in bankruptcy, 
the third party’s rights are protected by a liability rule; the debtor can rescind and pay 
damages at a fire sale.  The debtor’s rights under the contract, however, are protected by 
a property rule, except in the section 365(n) context, because the third party would have 
to negotiate with the debtor in order to preserve its rights or seek adequate protection, 
which may be difficult because of the procedural and substantive requirements of the 
automatic stay. 
202. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a).  “[T]he trustee, subject to the court’s approval, may as-
sume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.”  Id.; see GAME 
THEORY, supra note 125, at 122-23 (analyzing an example based on the franchise of a 
trademark). 
203. This conclusion stems from the implications of the assumption powers under 
section 365.  See GAME THEORY, supra note 125, at 141; see also Anthony Kronman, 
Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1978) (discussing specific performance in 
the contracts context); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 
271 (1979). 
204. See 11 U.S.C. § 365. 
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Specifically, if the value of the mark would be greater under 
the continuation of the franchise relationship, the bank as secured 
creditor can protect its interest in the mark by either requiring the 
franchisor to continue the relationship or to obtain financial protec-
tion, such as through cash or an equivalent secured claim in an-
other asset.  In this way, the secured creditor’s rights are still pro-
tected by a property rule when the franchisor enters bankruptcy.  If 
the franchisor rejects these options, however, the secured creditor 
will still have a claim in the mark, but the franchisee will only 
have an unsecured claim in bankruptcy.  Section 205(e) of the 
Copyright Act provides that among disputes between licensees and 
secured creditors, the first in time rule prevails.205  Under the ap-
plication of section 365(a), the priority could be reversed.  Essen-
tially the secured creditor’s rights against assignees of the mark are 
protected by a property rule. 
Reverse the situation and make the franchisee the debtor and 
the bank a secured creditor of the franchisee.  If the franchisee re-
jects, the secured creditor can still obtain adequate protection, 
which, if granted, would allow the creditor’s rights to trump the 
franchisee’s right to reject.  Once again, the secured creditor’s 
rights are protected by a property rule and, contrary to the provi-
sions of section 205(e) of the Copyright Act, the secured creditor’s 
rights would obtain priority over the rights of the franchisee. 
3. The 365(n) Regime 
The 365(n) regime also transforms the rights of parties operat-
ing in the non-bankruptcy regime.  Section 365(n), known popu-
larly as the “Intellectual Property Protection Act,” applies only to 
situations in which the licensor of intellectual property is the bank-
rupt party.206  For the purposes of section 365(n), “trademarks” do 
not fall into the definition of “intellectual property.” 
Under section 365(n), if the licensor chooses to reject the li-
cense, the licensee has the right to continue under the license or to 
seek a claim for breach of contract.  Thus, in the event of a rejec-
tion, the licensee can elect either damages or specific performance 
 
205. 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1994). 
206. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n). 
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as a remedy.  The licensee’s rights are protected by a property rule 
in the event of a rejection.  In contrast, under non-bankruptcy law, 
the licensee would more than likely be relegated to liability rule 
protection for his rights under the license. 
B. The Rationale Behind the Bankruptcy Code 
The bankruptcy treatment of property rights in intellectual 
property licenses raises two questions: (1) whether bankruptcy law 
imposes a different set of property rights than applicable non-
bankruptcy law, and (2) whether the particular transformation 
made by bankruptcy makes sense.  Toward answering these ques-
tions, this section addresses the recurring concerns of transaction 
costs within bankruptcy, executory contracts, and the rationales 
behind the 365(n) regime. 
1. Transaction Costs 
Arguably, transaction costs within bankruptcy are lower than 
outside of bankruptcy.207  Bankruptcy law provides procedural 
rules for the liquidation or reorganization of the debtor’s estate, 
thereby reducing the administrative and search costs that would 
arise if the debtor had to bargain with all the creditors.  Further-
more, information problems are lower in bankruptcy; valuation of 
assets is determined by the trustee—or at least settled through liti-
gation among the parties—if there is a dispute as to the value of a 
particular asset.208  As a result, bankruptcy is largely an issue of 
 
207. This conclusion is reached inferentially from the definition of transaction 
costs.  See supra note 149 (defining transaction costs).  “In general, transaction costs in-
clude the costs of identifying the parties with whom one has to bargain, the costs of get-
ting together with them, the costs of the bargaining process itself, and the costs of enforc-
ing any bargain reached.”  Polinsky, supra note 148, at 12.  As compared to the costs 
outside of bankruptcy, each of these elements are lower within the bankruptcy context.  
Bankruptcy provides a forum for the debtor and creditors to liquidate or restructure; as a 
result, the first two costs, of identifying and getting together, are necessarily lower.  
Bankruptcy provides detailed rules for how to bargain and enforce the non-bankruptcy 
bargain as administered by the trustee, thereby reducing the costs of the bargaining proc-
ess.  Finally, the costs of enforcing the bankruptcy decree, whether in liquidation or reor-
ganization, may be sizable, but is definitely lower than the free-for-all enforcement under 
state law.  See Jackson, supra note 191, at 7 (maintaining that the primary purpose of 
bankruptcy law is to reduce the collective action problem). 
208. In liquidation proceedings, “the valuation procedures are far from intractable.  
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how the pie is to be divided or restructured based on given rules.  
Because transaction costs are lower within bankruptcy, the prefer-
ence given to property rules facilitates bargaining within bank-
ruptcy. 
Property rules within bankruptcy would also provide lower 
transaction costs than outside of bankruptcy.  If bankruptcy rules 
allow for predictability, then contracting parties can, at least theo-
retically, value the contractual relationship upon the contingency 
that one of the parties enters bankruptcy.209  Bankruptcy law pro-
vides clear, immutable default rules for the contracting parties who 
may underestimate the probability of bankruptcy, and hence not 
prepare through express contractual terms for its occurrence.  
Bankruptcy certainly fulfills this purpose by respecting the state 
rules of priority, at least among secured and unsecured creditors.  
The trustee, with his strong arm powers under section 544,210 has 
the power to subordinate secured creditors who are not perfected at 
the time the bankruptcy petition is filed, just as any judicial credi-
tor who obtained a judgment against the debtor’s estate would. 
2. Executory Contracts 
The treatment of executory contracts, however, does not corre-
spond to the view of bankruptcy as providing clear, immutable 
rules that would allow contracting parties to value their positions 
in the contingency of bankruptcy.  Regardless of the nature of the 
long term relationship between the debtor and the third party out-
side bankruptcy, once the debtor files for bankruptcy, the debtor’s 
rights under the contract are protected by a property rule: He either 
receives specific performance or chooses to breach at a reduced 
 
The claims are measured, their relative priority is determined, and the proceeds, which 
because they are cash or marketable securities are easily valued, are distributed to the 
claimholders in the order of their relative nonbankruptcy entitlements.”  LOGIC & LIMITS, 
supra note 118, at 211-12.  In reorganization, the valuation problems are more difficult 
because the trustee and the creditors must value new claims against the debtor.  “Deter-
mining these values without using a market pricing mechanism is one of the hallmarks of 
a bankruptcy reorganization proceeding.  It is principally these valuation issues that lie at 
the core of the reorganization chapter’s provisions.”  Id. at 212. 
209. See Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable 
Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 225 (1982). 
210. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a). 
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level of damages.  The rules of bankruptcy are even stronger be-
cause “ipso facto” clauses, namely, clauses which state that the 
simple act of filing a bankruptcy petition is a material breach of 
contract, are held to be invalid.211  Furthermore, liquidated dam-
ages clauses are not enforceable if the debtor chooses to reject the 
contract; the third party can recover only actual contract dam-
ages.212  As a result, third parties cannot structure the contract in a 
way to protect their rights within bankruptcy.  For third parties en-
gaging in a long term contract with the debtor, bankruptcy law 
places discretion to continue under the contract in the hands of the 
debtor. 
From the perspective of the debtor, the discretion accorded by 
the bankruptcy treatment of executory contracts is justifiable.  Sec-
tion 365 concerns the assembly of the debtor’s estate; it is not an 
avoidance power, such as sections 544, 547, and 548.213  The pur-
pose of section 365 is to allow the trustee to manage the debtor’s 
estate without the burden of contractual obligations that diminish 
the value of the estate due to their inherent unprofitability.214  In 
this way, debtors are able to shift market risks off to the other con-
tracting party, while allowing the trustee to maximize the value of 
the estate for the benefit of all the creditors.  Nevertheless, the 
manner in which the trustee can use section 365 as an instrument 
of his avoidance power is troublesome.  Just as fraudulent convey-
ance law allows the trustee to rescind pre-bankruptcy contractual 
 
211. Section 365(b)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that the trustee cure any 
default in the contract before either assuming or rejecting it.  Id. § 365(b)(1)(A).  Section 
365(b)(2) provides that the requirement of cure does not apply to “a default that is a 
breach of a provision relating to . . . the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at 
any time before the closing of the case.”  Id. § 365(b)(2). 
212. See In re EI International, 123 B.R. 64 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1991) (refusing to 
enforce the liquidated damages clause of a computer software license that was rejected 
by the debtor; holding that the rejection of the license constituted a rejection of all of the 
terms contained in the license in accordance with federal bankruptcy policy); accord In 
re TransAmerican Natural Gas Co., 79 B.R. 663 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987).  But see In re 
Independent American Real Estate, Inc., 146 B.R. 546, 553 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992) (en-
forcing a liquidated damages clause in a rejected construction contract because the state 
law defines the remedies available to creditors). 
213. See Westbrook, supra note 125.  “Nothing about the nature of ‘rejection’ re-
quires that the trustee be able to undo (or ‘avoid’) what is tantamount to a consummated 
property transfer.”  GAME THEORY, supra note 125, at 121. 
214. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.c.2 (describing the role played by section 365). 
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arrangements, the trustee can rescind pre-bankruptcy executory 
contracts that are unprofitable under section 365.215  The rescis-
sionary power is limited only by the need to pay damages for 
breach, albeit at greatly reduced terms. 
The treatment of executory contracts is especially troubling in 
the context of intellectual property.  Under the current regime, the 
trustee in bankruptcy can assume or reject a trademark license.  If 
the debtor is the licensor, the protection accorded under section 
365 is similar to that accorded under trademark law, that is, prop-
erty rule protection for the underlying rights in the trademark.  If 
the debtor is the licensee, however, the rights are starkly different 
under bankruptcy than under applicable non-bankruptcy law.  The 
licensor of the trademark assumes the risk that the licensee will en-
ter bankruptcy and elect to assume a license that may have become 
unprofitable to the licensor.  Although the trademark owner still 
has the obligation to ensure that the goodwill underlying the 
trademark does not depreciate, the owner no longer has the right, 
in the event of the licensee’s bankruptcy, to rescind the license 
once the trustee has assumed it. 
Rights under the license are symmetric under bankruptcy law 
with respect to termination rights.  In fact, they are more symmet-
ric than in the non-bankruptcy contract, where the licensor can sue 
for infringement and the licensee can sue only for damages in case 
of breach by the licensor.  But the symmetry of the situation cannot 
explain the transformation of the licensee’s rights in bankruptcy 
from a liability rule to a property rule. 
The puzzle can be resolved by understanding the nature of 
property rights at issue within the bankruptcy and the non-
bankruptcy regimes.  Under the non-bankruptcy regime, the licen-
see’s rights are protected with respect to the licensor.  In bank-
ruptcy, however, the licensee’s rights are protected not against the 
licensor alone, but against all of the licensee’s creditors.216  The 
question from the trustee’s perspective is whether the licensee 
should continue performance under the license in order to maxi-
 
215. 11 U.S.C. § 365. 
216. This is implicit in the notion that bankruptcy should be designed to protect the 
creditors’ bargain.  See Jackson, supra note 191; Jackson & Scott, supra note 192. 
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mize the estate for the benefit of all creditors.  As a result, the de-
cision to assume or reject by the trustee, when the licensee is the 
debtor, is a transfer from the licensor to all of the creditors.  In 
contrast, the rights of the licensor under the trademark license are 
against the rest of the world, not just against the specific licensee.  
Consequently, under section 365, bankruptcy law respects the 
property rights system for trademark owners under non-bankruptcy 
law and expands rights for licensees, because bankruptcy’s goal is 
to restructure or liquidate the debtor’s obligations with regard to 
all creditors. 
3. Analyzing Rationales Behind the 365(n) Regime 
The 365(n) regime demonstrates that the scheme for non-
trademark intellectual property is decidedly different.  Neverthe-
less, it is fair to query whether the distinction between trademark 
and other types of intellectual property makes sense.  At one level, 
the distinction is logical because the property rights system under 
trademark is distinct from the system for the other types of intel-
lectual property. 
It is important to contrast the treatment of trademark with that 
of copyright.  Under copyright law, the owner of the intellectual 
property can protect his rights against the rest of the world through 
property rules, with some major exceptions for compulsory li-
censes and other exceptions under the fair use doctrine.  If the pur-
pose of bankruptcy law is to provide certainty for contracting par-
ties in their valuation of the bankruptcy contingency, then 
bankruptcy law should respect non-bankruptcy law as much as 
possible.  As a result, a different scheme for copyright would be 
warranted. 
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to consider whether the scheme 
imposed by section 365(n) is appropriate.  If the licensor is the 
debtor, then under section 365(n), the licensee has the option to 
choose remedies upon either assumption or rejection by the trustee.  
In effect, the licensee’s rights are protected by a property rule 
within bankruptcy, when it would have been protected by a liabil-
ity rule outside of bankruptcy.  Furthermore, under non-bankruptcy 
law, the licensor’s rights under the license are protected by a 
mixed property-liability rule against the licensee.  Within bank-
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ruptcy, the licensor’s rights are to be ascertained with respect to all 
creditors, not simply the licensee.  Unlike trademark, in which the 
licensor has clear rights in the use of the mark, in the context of 
copyright, the scope of the licensor’s rights under the license are 
unclear. 
The anomaly in bankruptcy’s treatment of copyright is under-
scored by the asymmetric treatment of licensor and licensee bank-
ruptcies.  If the licensee is the debtor, then the trustee can assume 
or reject the license for the copyrighted work just as the trustee 
could in the case of a trademark license.  The licensee’s rights in 
the license are protected by a property rule within bankruptcy.  As 
with trademark, bankruptcy law transfers value from the licensor 
to all of the licensee’s creditors.  The policy reason for this transfer 
is the same, that is, to ensure that the licensee-debtor’s estate is 
maximized for the benefit of all the creditors.  Furthermore, as 
with its treatment of trademarks, bankruptcy law imposes an 
asymmetry between the licensor and the licensee.  In the trademark 
context, this asymmetry could be explained by the goal of maxi-
mizing the value of the debtor’s estate for the benefit of all the 
creditors.  In the copyright context, this explanation is not as co-
gent.  For trademark licenses, the licensor and licensee both have 
property rule protection for their rights under the license in bank-
ruptcy.  For copyright licenses, only the licensee has property rule 
protection under the license in bankruptcy; thus, the value of the 
debtor’s estate may not be maximized when the licensor is the 
debtor. 
This last anomaly can be explained by appeal to the goals of 
trademark and copyright.  Trademark law is designed to provide 
incentives for the creation of distinctive names that denote quality 
or source of the product.217  The trademark owner obtains strong 
property protection in the mark not only to provide incentives for 
the creation of the mark, but also to protect consumers against con-
fusion or misuse of the mark.  Copyright law, on the other hand, is 
designed to provide incentives for the creation of original works218 
 
217. See 15 U.S.C. § 15021 (providing for registration of marks “by which the 
goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others”). 
218. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (outlining author’s exclusive rights). 
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and also to protect rights of access to use of the works.219  The 
strong protection given to licensees in bankruptcy is designed not 
simply to protect the licensee’s rights, but also to protect the con-
sumer’s rights of access to the work, when one of the parties to the 
license has entered bankruptcy.220 
IV. OPTIMISTIC AND PESSIMISTIC NOTES ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY VIRTUES AND SECURED CREDIT VICES 
This part brings the distinct perspectives of optimists and pes-
simists into the discussion.  Each group’s viewpoint is character-
ized by how it balances the intellectual property right holder’s in-
terests against the public’s interests.  Moreover, the courts’ 
treatment of optimistic and pessimistic concerns are especially en-
lightening. 
A. Overview of Optimism and Pessimism 
Professor Paul Goldstein distinguishes “copyright optimists” 
from “copyright pessimists.”221  The copyright optimists believe 
that broad rights should be granted to the copyright owner, in order 
to provide the correct incentives to produce the creative work and 
to disseminate the fruit of his efforts to the public.  This Article 
adopts the position that a copyright optimist believes in the use of 
property rules and the resulting market system in order to effi-
ciently balance exclusion rights and access rights.  Copyright pes-
simists, on the other hand, construe the copyright holder’s property 
right narrowly and believe that the law should provide the minimal 
 
219. See id. § 102 (defining “scope of protection”). 
220. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 
YALE. L.J. 283, 387 (concluding that “[t]he democratic paradigm posits . . . that copyright 
should be defined and delimited to engender an information infrastructure populated with 
a lively interplay of sustained works of authorship”).  Always at the background of the 
“information infrastructure” is the manner in which such an infrastructure is financed.  
The role of debt finance in creating the works of authorship will feedback on the infra-
structure.  Thomas Jefferson’s view of debt highlights this interplay.  “The future that 
Jefferson envisioned, the liberal future in the current scholarly shorthand, is thus one in 
which a purified and truer republicanism prevails, a republicanism not longer at the 
mercy of the forces of debt and corruption.”  HERBERT E. SLOAN, PRINCIPLE AND 
INTEREST: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE PROBLEM OF DEBT 9 (1995). 
221. See COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY, supra note 44, at 24. 
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protection necessary to allow the copyright owner to produce the 
creative work.  Pessimists strike a balance between exclusion and 
access rights with a bias towards access.  A liberal standard for fair 
use coupled with compulsory licenses serves as the tools to pro-
mote the dissemination of the copyrighted work, with prices set so 
that the copyright owner will be able to recoup costs with a fair 
profit for the investment of his effort.222 
Although Professor Goldstein acknowledges the overlap be-
tween copyright and trademark, he does not divide the world into 
trademark pessimists and trademark optimists.223  This exclusion 
reflects both the narrower scope of trademark law and the more se-
cure legal position of trademark relative to copyright.  Trademark 
covers names, marks, and brands—all identifiers that signal quality 
and the origin of products.  Copyright, on the other hand, covers a 
range of creative and artistic expression that on one level is purely 
functional, such as computer programs, and at another level is 
purely aesthetic, such as films.  The content of copyright is deeper 
and richer than that of trademark; as a result, the access rights are 
more crucial.  Furthermore, trademark law is largely a system of 
property rules with strong market protection for the trademark 
owner.  The Lanham Act does not have an analogue to the fair use 
doctrine224 or to the remedy of compulsory licensing that exists 
under the Copyright Act. 
All of which does not mean that the optimists have occupied 
the field of trademark law.  At least in the area of gray markets, a 
battle rages whose terms are similar to that between copyright op-
timists and pessimists.225  A gray market is an unauthorized distri-
bution channel for trademarked goods.226  Typically, the market 
 
222. See id. at 20. 
223. See discussion supra note 57 and accompanying text (describing the overlap 
between copyright and trademark). 
224. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 107 (enacting the fair use doctrine, which allows the 
limited use of copyrighted works for certain purposes which do not have any substantial 
adverse effect on the copyright holders’ rights), with 15 U.S.C. § 110 (stating that the fair 
use defense is not available under the Lanham Act). 
225. See Ghosh, supra note 57, at 375-83. 
226. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 285 (1988) (stating that “a 
gray market good is a foreign-manufactured good bearing a valid United States trade-
mark, that is imported without the consent of the United States trademark holder”).  See 
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arises internationally, where a foreign entrepreneur buys United 
States trademarked products manufactured and distributed over-
seas, and resells the products in the United States through outlets, 
such as 47th Street Photo, K-Mart, or Sam’s Discount Furniture.  
Gray markets allow the marked product to be sold to a broader 
public at a reduced price, often at the expense of the advertising 
and goodwill developed by the original manufacturer.  Just as the 
issue of access versus exclusion in the copyright arena is divided 
between optimists and pessimists, the debate over gray markets is 
divided between trademark universalists and trademark territorial-
ists.227 
Trademark universalists, like their cousins, the copyright opti-
mists, believe in global protection for a mark, independent of the 
source of origin of the products that the mark brands.  Universal-
ists believe in protection for the gray market because there is no 
deception in the use of the mark when the product is sold through 
an unlicensed distributor to the public.  If the product is marked 
“SONY,” according to the universalists, the mark signals the ori-
gin of the product, regardless of whether the product is bought 
from a gray market outlet in New York or San Francisco’s China-
town, or from an authorized dealer.228  Trademark territorialists, on 
the other hand, seek to restrict the gray market on the grounds that 
a trademark cannot be separated from the underlying goodwill that 
has been cultivated by the trademark owner.  Because the gray 
market outlet has not expended the goodwill behind the “SONY” 
label, to take the above example, it would be deceptive for the un-
authorized outlet to sell a “SONY” labeled product.229  Therefore, 
trademark territorialists would support strong property rule protec-
 
generally Stephen W. Feingold, Judicial Update: High Court Set to Revisit Grey Market 
Goods Issue, CORP. COUNS., Aug. 1997, at 3 (providing legal analysis of gray market 
goods). 
227. See Ghosh, supra note 57, at 384-85. 
228. See Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 1886) (holding that a 
German importer selling bottled water with the label of a Hungarian manufacturer in the 
United States did not violate the trademark rights of the Hungarian company because the 
goods were genuine). 
229. See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923) (holding that the 
importer of a French product bearing a United States trademark into the United States 
violated trademark laws because the product could only be sold with the goodwill of the 
business). 
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tion for trademark owners much like copyright optimists would for 
their bailiwick.230 
Because of the parallel positions that exist in the areas of copy-
right and trademark, it is possible to speak in general of “intellec-
tual property optimists” and “intellectual property pessimists.”231  
The optimists believe in property rules and markets to secure pro-
duction and distribution of intellectual property.  The pessimists 
believe in liability rules and a regulated exchange in order to pro-
mote access and the limited returns necessary to encourage the 
creation of the intellectual property.  Although optimists and pes-
simists will have identifiable positions on intellectual property law 
issues, such as the regulation of the gray market and the scope of 
the fair use doctrine, they should also have identifiable positions 
on secured credit.  In fact, because of the increased use of copy-
rights and trademarks in secured credit, and the resulting implica-
tions under article 9 and bankruptcy, the implications of the law of 
secured credit on the policy goals of copyright and trademark de-
serves greater consideration.  To put it bluntly, one must determine 
how optimists and pessimists view the treatment of trademarks and 
copyrights under the law of secured credit. 
 
230. Many authors have made recent contributions to the gray market debate.  See, 
e.g., Shashank Upadhye, Rewriting the Lanham Trademark Act to Prohibit the Importa-
tion of All Gray Market Goods, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 59 (1996) (arguing against the 
gray market); Margo A. Bagley, Comment, Using Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to 
Block Materially Different Gray Market Goods in the Common Control Context: Are Re-
ports of its Death Greatly Exaggerated?, 44 EMORY L.J. 1541 (1995) (exploring the rela-
tionship between section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and gray market goods); Christo-
pher A. Mohr, Comment, Gray Market Goods and Copyright Law: An End Run Around 
Kmart v. Cartier, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 561 (1996) (discussing the impact of the Kmart 
case on gray market goods). 
231. In light of my previous critique of the common control exception, supra note 
57, and because this Article appears to support gray marketing, some may question 
whether I truly am an “intellectual property optimist,” as the title of this Article suggests.  
My can be explained in two ways.  First, the criticisms are solely about the application of 
the common control exception, which fails to adequately distinguish between licensing 
and parent-subsidiary relationships, especially because of the view that a firm is in es-
sence a “nexus of contracts.”  Second, the international trade aspects of gray marketing 
add another dimension not adequately explored in the textual discussion of pessimists 
and optimists.  Because promoting gray markets advances free trade, thereby opening 
international markets, from an international trade perspective, a position in favor of gray 
markets is consistent with the optimist’s view of intellectual property. 
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Due to the fragmented nature of the treatment of copyright and 
trademark under both article 9 and the bankruptcy laws, one would 
expect that the law would provide something for everyone.  And, 
in fact, the law does just that.  Optimists would like the section 
365(a) regime under bankruptcy, with its strong property rule pro-
tection for trademark licensors, but shudder at the protection given 
to licensees in bankruptcy to assume a license that may be unprof-
itable to the licensor.  Pessimists would like the protection given to 
licensees under section 365(n) because it limits the rights of the li-
censor to deny access and use of the technology within bankruptcy. 
Secured credit with the use of trademark and copyright as col-
lateral poses a deeper puzzle for pessimists and optimists alike.  
On the one hand, by providing a source of finance, secured credit 
allows for the production of copyrights and trademarks.  The copy-
right or trademark owner can produce his product by shifting some 
of the risk of creation to a third party via contract.  Copyright op-
timists and pessimists would both appreciate this dimension of se-
cured credit.  On the other hand, secured credit gives the creditor a 
property interest in the intellectual property, allowing the creditor 
to seize the property in the case of default.  Such a scheme would 
make optimists shudder, as it allows the intellectual property crea-
tor to be divested of a property right.  Pessimists may cheer be-
cause the scheme potentially allows access as the secured creditor 
may disseminate the work in ways that the original creator may 
not.  The potential delays in disseminating the work, however, 
would give the pessimists pause, especially in light of the Orion 
bankruptcy and Spike Lee’s own history.232 
The conflict between the optimists and pessimists reflects the 
diverging distributional goals of the Bankruptcy Code and article 
 
232. See discussion supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (describing the Orion 
bankruptcy).  See Scott M. Martin & Peter W. Smith, The Unconstitutionality of State 
Motion Picture Film Lien Laws (or How Spike Lee Almost Lost It), 39 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 
61 (1989), for a discussion of Spike Lee’s woes in financing his first major film project, 
She’s Gotta Have It, using intellectual property as collateral.  Spike Lee’s troubles with 
the law of secured credit illustrate the problem with state lien laws that allow creditors 
extensive rights to attach the collateral of the debtor in which they have a security inter-
est.  In Spike Lee’s case, creditors attached and were threatening to auction off prints and 
negatives of his work-in-progress.  See id. at 63.  Martin and Smith argue effectively for 
the preemption of the state lien laws by the Copyright Act.  Id. at 84-87, 91-94. 
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9.  The Bankruptcy Code contains a fresh start procedure that al-
lows individuals escape the contractual prison of debt obligations.  
Although article 9 is also procedural, it facilitates the formation of 
contracts by creating immutable rules that provide certainty with 
regards to recurring disputes.  On the other hand, the Bankruptcy 
Code creates certainty in liquidating, discharging, and restructur-
ing debt.  Together, the Bankruptcy Code and article 9 create a 
property rights system that protects debtors through property rules 
and allows for the creation and liquidation of debt. 
In light of this characterization of the law of secured credit, one 
would expect that the assessment of intellectual property pessi-
mists and optimists will rest in large part on the identity of the 
debtor.  Intellectual property optimists will support provisions that 
secure the property right of the intellectual property licensor; pes-
simists will support provisions that secure the property right of the 
licensee.  Similarly, optimists will support provisions of article 9 
that protect the debtor, and pessimists will support provisions that 
protect the creditor.  At one level, the problem of predicting the at-
titudes of optimists and pessimists toward secured credit is largely 
one of predicting the identity of the debtor. 
B. Case Law in Support of Optimism and Pessimism 
The attitudes of optimists and pessimists toward secured credit 
rests on the predictability and clarity that the law provides.  The 
use of copyrights and trademarks as collateral, though recognized, 
was not considered when drafting the intellectual property laws or 
the law of secured credit.233  Hence, we are left with lacunae in the 
law, such as the problem of priority disputes between assignees 
and secured creditors.  In order to fill these gaps, one must engage 
in the tools of statutory interpretation and policy analysis.  Interest-
ingly enough, many of the gaps in the law are resolved through 
private bargaining and negotiation.  Despite the lack of clarity in 
the law, copyrights and trademarks are a significant form of collat-
eral, both quantitatively and in aggregate value.234  The case for in-
 
233. See Haemmerli, supra note 11, at 1721; Weinberg & Woodward, supra note 
109, at 106. 
234. See Haemmerli, supra note 11, at 1651-52. 
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tellectual property pessimism or optimism may hinge on empirical 
issues rather than formal theory.  To provide empirical content to 
the analysis, this section focuses on the principal cases dealing 
with the treatment of copyrights and trademarks as collateral. 
1. Support for the Pessimists 
A franchisor licenses his trademark and goodwill to a franchi-
see that subsequently goes bankrupt.  The franchise agreement sets 
out royalty payments, obligations of the franchisor to use its efforts 
to maintain the quality of the franchise, and a covenant not to com-
pete by the franchisee.  In bankruptcy, the franchisee chooses to 
reject the agreement under section 365, but the franchisor wishes 
to enforce the covenant not to compete. 
One should consider whether the franchisor can enjoin the 
former franchisee from competing.  For intellectual property opti-
mists, the desired answer would be yes.  Even if the former fran-
chisee has no rights in the trademark upon rejection, accumulated 
goodwill may persist in the former franchisee’s business, and the 
optimists would reason that the former franchisee would diminish 
the value of the franchisor’s rights in the mark by using that accu-
mulated goodwill.  The pessimists, on the other hand, would seek 
to limit the franchisor’s monopoly profits and would favor the dis-
semination of goodwill by not enforcing the covenant not to com-
pete. 
On this matter, the intellectual property pessimists can count a 
victory in the case In re Rovine Corp.,235 where the court rejected 
the franchisor’s argument that the covenant not to compete was 
severable from the rest of the license and enforceable against the 
franchisee, even upon rejection in bankruptcy.  According to the 
court, the franchise agreement could only be rejected in its entirety 
or not at all.  This aspect of the court’s holding is not surprising.  
What is more curious, and potentially more troubling for intellec-
tual property optimists, is the court’s reasoning as to the applica-
bility of section 365.  The Rovine court reasoned that, if the fran-
chisor did not have outstanding obligations under the agreement, 
then the franchisee-debtor would not have the power to reject.  Be-
 
235. 6 B.R. 661 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980). 
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cause the franchisor’s continuing obligation was to maintain the 
goodwill and reputation of the mark, the court’s reasoning places 
franchisors in a bind: Either sacrifice control over the mark and 
goodwill making the contract non-executory, and hence, non-
rejectable, or maintain control over the mark and allow the debtor 
to reject.  In the first instance, the franchisor could enforce the 
covenant not to compete; in the second, the franchisor could not.  
The court’s reasoning further erodes the franchisor’s property 
rights in the trademark.  If the franchisor were to sacrifice control, 
he runs the risk of abandoning the mark because the license would 
become an assignment in gross.  On the other hand, maintaining 
control limits the franchisor’s ability to enjoin the franchisee from 
competition. 
Regardless of whether the license agreement is executory, the 
franchisee can always terminate the contract.  “Executoriness” 
makes a difference only in terms of the remedies available to the 
franchisor.  If the franchisee breaches, even in bankruptcy, the 
franchisor will obtain a claim for damages against the franchisee or 
his bankruptcy estate.  In the event of a breach, however, the cove-
nant not to compete would more than likely be severable, allowing 
the franchisor to enjoin the franchisee from continuing his business 
as a going concern.  Through the application of section 365, the 
Rovine court transferred a valuable property right from the franchi-
sor to the franchisee.236 
Courts have similarly undermined the property interests of 
trademark owners in the context of secured credit.  As part of a 
bankruptcy reorganization, the trustee sells the debtor’s trademarks 
and other assets to a third party.  A prior secured creditor inter-
venes to challenge the sale on the grounds that he has a perfected 
security interest in the marks.  There is no question that the se-
cured creditor and the debtor had a valid security agreement trans-
ferring an interest in the mark to the creditor as security.  Never-
theless, there is a genuine question about perfection.  The creditor 
filed his interest pursuant to state law governing general intangi-
bles, but it is unclear where the secured creditor should have filed 
his security interest. 
 
236. Id. at 665-66. 
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In In re Roman Cleanser Co., 237 the court held that a federal 
filing with the P.T.O. was not necessary and the valid state filing 
sufficed to perfect the debtor’s interests.238  The court’s reasoning 
was based on a reading of section 10 of the Lanham Act, requiring 
the recording of assignments of trademarks, but not other trans-
fers.239  Because the court concluded that a grant of a security in-
terest is not an assignment, federal filing is not required to per-
fect.240 
The court’s rationale is particularly revealing.  According to 
the court (1) Congress could have provided a means for recording 
security interests in trademarks, but chose not to do so; (2) Con-
gress intended to protect the public from the deceptive use of 
trademarks; (3) a secured creditor with a security interest in a 
trademark cannot use the trademark, unless the debtor defaults; 
thus, (4) security interests in trademarks cannot lead to public de-
ception.241  The court’s reasoning, however, may be troublesome. 
“Future assignments,” which would occur if the debtor did de-
fault and the secured creditor attached the trademark, are not in-
cluded in “assignments” under section 10 of the Lanham Act.242  
But, arguably, it is the very contingency of debtor default and sub-
sequent attachment, which makes the granting of a security interest 
particularly misleading to the public, at least to those who are ob-
taining presently valid assignments.  The result is analogous to the 
“floating lien,” condemned by the court in Benedict v. Ratner,243 
where the problem was one of the separation of ownership and 
possession.244  In the trademark context, the problem is one of sub-
dividing the rights of ownership among assignees and creditors 
with a system of notice that is potentially complex. 
The problem is exacerbated by the provision within section 10 
 
237. 43 B.R. 940 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984). 
238. Id. at 945-46. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. at 943-44. 
241. Id. 
242. See id. at 946. 
243. 268 U.S. 353 (1925). 
244. See supra note 60 (describing the “floating lien” problem in Benedict v. Rat-
ner). 
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of the Lanham Act, which determines priority among assignees 
through a first to file system against subsequent purchasers.245  The 
priority rules are consistent with those under the U.C.C., which 
also adopts a first to file or perfect system, in order to determine 
priority disputes among secured creditors.  As Roman Cleanser in-
dicates,246 conflicts between assignees and secured creditors will 
most likely also be resolved through a first to file system.  The 
complication is that section 10 provides a three-month relation-
back period for filing, wholly absent from state law.  As a result, 
potential gaps in the law exist. 
Intellectual property pessimists should appreciate Roman 
Cleanser.  Although the case seems to permit the use of a floating 
lien in the context of trademarks, the uncertainty over an assign-
ment of marks raises some doubt about a trademark owner’s ability 
to assign a mark and obtain full value for the assignment.  As a re-
sult, a crucial property interest of the trademark owner is reduced 
in value and scope. 
The Roman Cleanser case is not, however, a clear victory for 
pessimists.  If the value of an assignment cuts into the trademark 
owner’s monopoly profits, then the ability to disseminate the mark 
and the accompanying access rights are also reduced.  One must 
determine whether the effects of the reduction in the profits of the 
trademark owner from the transaction is larger than the effects of 
the reduction in the number of licenses. 
There are several reasons to believe that Roman Cleanser may 
reduce the trademark owner’s profits while not limiting the dis-
semination or access to the mark.  In an ideal world, the floating 
lien system of secured credit would allow the trademark owner to 
receive a cash advance on future royalty payments on licenses.247  
If the trademark owner grants a security interest in the marks in 
exchange for money and the security interest is perfected correctly, 
then future licensees take the mark subject to the security interest.  
This subordination would reduce the royalty terms of the future li-
 
245. See Roman Cleanser, 43 B.R. at 946. 
246. Id. 
247. See Julian B. McDonnell, The Floating Lienor as Good Faith Purchaser, 50 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 429, 429-35 (1977), for a description of the use of the floating lien and the 
advantages to both creditors and debtors. 
GHOSH.TYP 9/29/2006  4:47 PM 
1997] MORPHING OF PROPERTY RULES AND LIABILITY RULES 165 
censes.  If markets are working perfectly, then the floating lien is 
simply a transfer from the future to the present, and there should be 
no change in the number of licenses.  The only difference would be 
in the timing of the trademark owner’s profits. 
Of course, actual licensing and financing arrangements are far 
from ideal.  The secured creditor bears the burden of perfecting his 
interest.  If he fails to do so or does so incorrectly, a subsequent li-
censee may take over the secured creditor.  The risk is shared be-
tween subsequent licensees and the secured creditor.  Because of 
this added risk, licensees may be more reluctant to license the 
trademark and those who do will require lower royalty payments 
because of the added risk.  The franchisor ultimately loses in terms 
of profits and dissemination of the mark.  Although this is clearly 
not a victory for intellectual property optimists, it is no more than a 
hollow victory for intellectual property pessimists. 
A less ambiguous victory for intellectual property pessimists 
can be found in the treatment of security interests in licenses held 
by licensees.  In In re Specialty Foods of Pittsburgh, Inc.,248 the 
court held that licensees of trademarks could use the licenses as 
security interests.  Security creditors could attach the license in 
case of default by the licensee.  The secured creditor, however, had 
to expressly state in the security agreement with the debtor that the 
license was the subject of the collateral.  As a result, licensees can 
finance the use of trademarks through secured credit. 
Furthermore, secured creditors’ rights will trump the rights of 
the trademark licensor, presumably the owner of the mark.  Be-
cause the licensee can assume the license under Rovine, the se-
cured creditor’s interests would attach to the license through bank-
ruptcy.  Therefore, the secured creditor would receive priority in 
assets of the debtor up to the value of the license.  Moreover, if the 
licensee chose to reject, as in Rovine, the secured creditor would 
be entitled to adequate protection for his security interest.  In either 
case, there is a transfer from the licensor to the secured creditor.  
The bankruptcy treatment of the licensee’s use of the trademark 
under a franchise agreement and under a security interest are 
strong victories for the pessimist camp. 
 
248. 98 B.R. 734, 736 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989). 
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2. Support for the Optimists 
Interestingly enough, all of the cases in support of the pessi-
mists involve trademarks.  One trademark case that is perhaps an 
ambiguous victory for the optimists is In re Lady Madonna,249 
which involved the use of trade names by the trademark owner as 
security for a loan.  The court held that the secured creditor’s in-
terest in the marks were invalid because of an inadequate descrip-
tion of the marks in the security agreement.  As a result, the se-
cured creditor’s interests were unprotected and the trademark 
owner’s marks were left unencumbered.  Lady Madonna indicates 
that all is not lost for intellectual property optimists in the realm of 
trademarks. 
The case for the optimists is somewhat stronger in the realm of 
copyrights.  The case is not as strong as it could be because of sec-
tion 365(n),250 which provides licensees of intellectual property, 
that is, copyrights but not trademarks under the Bankruptcy Code, 
strong property right protection against licensors.  Section 365(n) 
must be placed in the pessimist camp.  But bankruptcy court rul-
ings pertaining to security interests in copyrights offer hope for the 
intellectual property optimists. 
Foremost is the Peregrine case, in which the court held that se-
curity interests in copyright can be perfected only by a filing with 
the Copyright Office.251  The court’s holding rested on the recorda-
tion provisions of the Copyright Act, which, unlike the provisions 
of the Lanham Act, applies to “assignment” and “transfers.”252  
Because the court held that the Copyright Act provided a unified 
system of recordation that was consistent with article 9, a federal 
filing was the sole means of perfection.  In In re AEG Acquisition 
Corp. v. Zenith Productions, Ltd.,253 the court extended its holding 
to cover films and other artistic works that do not have to be regis-
tered with the Copyright Office under the Berne Convention for 
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (“Berne Conven-
 
249. 99 B.R. 536 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
250. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(n) (West 1997). 
251. In re Peregrine Entertainment, Ltd., 116 B.R. 194, 199-200 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
1990). 
252. Id. 
253. 127 B.R. 34 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991). 
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tion”)254 because the terms of the Berne Convention were not self-
executing and did not apply to the creation of security interests 
within the United States.255 
A unified, federal system of filing for copyright does not run 
the risk of dividing entitlements and ownership like the separate 
state and federal filing system for trademarks.  As a result, copy-
right obtains greater property-like protection than trademarks; a 
clear victory for optimists.  The interaction with section 365(n) is 
exemplified by the recently decided Emplexx case.256  The debtor, 
AGI Software Inc. (“AGI”), was a consortium of twenty-five pri-
vate colleges, collectively owning rights in specialized software 
designed to aid in university administration.  In order to market the 
software, AGI created a spin-off company called Emplexx with 
which AGI entered into an exclusive licensing agreement.  Under 
the terms of the agreement, AGI would transfer rights in the soft-
ware to Emplexx, which would be responsible for marketing and 
sublicensing, in exchange for a share of the sublicense royalties 
and the assumption of certain lease and financial obligations of 
AGI. 
A few months prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition by 
AGI, Emplexx failed to give adequate assurances that it would 
guarantee AGI’s financial obligations under the terms of the li-
cense.  AGI, subsequent to Emplexx’s failure to grant assurances 
and prior to the petition, granted a software license to a third party.  
In the bankruptcy proceedings, Emplexx moved to have the trustee 
assume or reject the AGI-Emplexx license and then assert Em-
plexx’s rights as licensee under section 365(n). 
According to the court, Emplexx failed to provide AGI with 
adequate assurances and was in breach of the license, therefore, 
AGI had “effectively terminated the License Agreement pursuant 
 
254. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 
1886, completed at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on Nov. 13, 1908, completed 
at Berne on Mar. 20, 1914, revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, at Brussels on June 26, 
1948, at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and at Paris on July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Berne Convention]. 
255. Id. 
256. In re AGI Software Inc., 199 B.R. 850 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995). 
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to its terms.”257  Because of Emplexx’s breach, “[t]here was no 
agreement for the Trustee to assume or reject, and therefore sum-
mary judgment should be entered against Emplexx . . . .”258  Fi-
nally, the court also held that Emplexx could not vacate the auto-
matic stay in order to assert the validity of the license because 
“there was no valid agreement at the time of the filing of the peti-
tion.”259  Thus, the court continued, “Emplexx is not a secured 
creditor, and may not seek relief from the stay for lack of adequate 
protection . . . .”260 
The AGI case represents a clear victory for the intellectual 
property licensor and suggests that the pre-petition breach by the 
licensee may be a way to avoid the section 365(n) regime.261 
V. EMBEDDING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING GAME IN 
THE BANKRUPTCY GAME:  THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ACCESS AND SECURED CREDIT 
Economic analyses often culminate in what can be called in-
variance results, which state that certain economic decisions are 
invariant to some exogenous set of conditions.262  The use of intel-
lectual property in secured transactions calls into play three types 
of invariance results.  The first is the Coase Theorem,263 which 
states that in a world of zero transaction costs, the final allocation 
of rights will be invariant to the initial distribution rights under the 
legal system.  Very broadly, this result would apply to both the 
way intellectual property rights are defined and the way rights are 
 
257. Id. at 862. 
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
260. Id. 
261. The facts are particularly striking because AGI was the parent of Emplexx and 
presumably exercised extensive control over the its management and governance of Em-
plexx.  The result of the case suggests that license agreements between parents and sub-
sidiaries can be removed from the section 365(n) regime by forcing a breach prior to the 
filing of a bankruptcy petition by the parent. 
262. See, e.g., William G. Shepherd, Potential Competition Versus Actual Competi-
tion, 42 Admin. L. Rev. 5, 20 (stating that “exogenous conditions are embedded in the 
nature of each industry, and they are governed by technology and demand”). 
263. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained: The 
Ironic History of the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397, 399 (1997) (describing the de-
velopment of the Coase Theorem). 
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divided between debtors and creditors.  The second invariance re-
sult is the Modigliani-Miller Theorem,264 which very broadly 
states that the value of a company is invariant to whether the com-
pany is financed by debt, equity, or a combination thereof.  In the 
secured transaction context, this result would undermine the argu-
ment that secured creditors create value in terms of reducing moni-
toring costs, and would support the view that secured credit is 
merely a transfer from unsecured to secured creditors.  Finally, the 
third invariance result is the Fisher Separation Theorem,265 which 
states that the decision on what goods to produce is independent of 
how the production is financed.  In economic terms, the separation 
theorem means that the real and financial sectors of the economy 
are independent of each other.  In the context of intellectual prop-
erty, the separation theorem means that the mix and quantity of in-
tellectual property produced in society is independent of how the 
project to create the property is financed. 
Each of these results are true in a theoretical sense under ideal 
conditions.  The Coase Theorem is true in a world of no transac-
tion costs.  The Modigliani-Miller and the Fisher Separation Theo-
rems apply in a world of complete and perfect markets, including 
financial markets.  The role of law is to either create imperfections 
in the ideal world or to be irrelevant to the final outcome, assuming 
once again that economic and social conditions are ideal.  Of 
course, the actual world falls short of the ideal conditions.  The 
purpose of these theorems is to aid in analytically identifying the 
causes of imperfection and the manner in which legal results can 
facilitate a result that yields efficient trade and bargaining.  The 
three invariance results serve to frame the analysis of the proper 
treatment of intellectual property as collateral for secured transac-
tions. 
Consider first the implications of the Coase Theorem.  If the 
theorem were true, allocating property rights as the right to ex-
clude and the right of access would be unnecessary.  Ownership 
interests in trademarks and copyrights would be held by those who 
 
264. See Modigliani & Miller, supra note 169; see also Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: 
Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945, 999 (1991) (dis-
cussing the Modigliani-Miller Theorem as it relates to invariance results). 
265. See Ayres, supra note 264, at 994. 
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could use the property most efficiently, regardless of whether the 
right to exclude or right of access was protected.  This conclusion, 
however, overlooks the problem of whether the intellectual prop-
erty would be created in the first place. 
Suppose that the law protected the right of access.  Individuals 
could copy works as long as damage awards were paid ex post.  
The potential creator of intellectual property would create a work 
only if the expected damage awards were greater than the costs of 
production.  A market for licensing the work would not be created 
because, if parties could procure the work by copying and paying 
damages, there would be no incentive to obtain a license.  As a re-
sult, the potential revenues from creating and distributing the work 
would be diminished.  The initial allocation of the property right, 
either to the creator or to the user, will affect the mix and type of 
intellectual property that is produced and disseminated. 
Now consider the Modigliani-Miller Theorem as applied to fi-
nancing the creation of intellectual property.  For the sake of 
analysis, assume that the creator of the work incorporates and the 
sole asset of the newly formed corporation is the intellectual prop-
erty.  According to this theorem, the value of the corporation will 
be independent of the mix of debt and equity used to finance the 
creation of the work.  If this theorem is true, then it is irrelevant 
whether the creator uses secured or unsecured debt or equity as the 
means of financing. 
The law of secured transactions and bankruptcy serves only to 
redistribute wealth from unsecured to secured creditors.  The pos-
sibility of bankruptcy, however, makes this conclusion untenable.  
As a firm uses more debt to finance its ventures the probability of 
bankruptcy also rises; the increase in the probability of bankruptcy 
reduces the ex ante value of the firm.  The value of the firm will 
depend, nevertheless, not only on the probability of bankruptcy but 
also on the value of the firm’s assets and liabilities within bank-
ruptcy.  Therefore, the substance of bankruptcy law will also affect 
the value of the firm as evinced by the earlier discussion of section 
365.  The value of the firm, in short, will not be invariant to the 
mix of debt and equity used. 
Finally, the exceptions to the invariance results affect the in-
variance between production and finance predicted by the Fisher 
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Separation Theorem.  This last invariance result would predict that 
the decision on what types and how much intellectual property are 
produced will be independent of the means for financing the pro-
duction of such property.  The fact that neither the Coase Theorem 
nor the Modigliani-Miller Theorem is likely to hold in general, and 
particularly in the case of financing the production of intellectual 
property, undermines the applicability of the Fisher Separation 
Theorem.  After all, if it matters whether the property right is as-
signed to the creditor or to the debtor under article 9 and federal 
bankruptcy law, contra the Coase Theorem, then the production of 
a copyright or a trademark, for example, will depend upon how the 
production is financed. 
The Spike Lee saga is a perfect example of the failure of in-
variance.  Mr. Lee used the underlying film stock and negatives as 
collateral for his project; when his creditors attached this collat-
eral, Mr. Lee’s ability to complete and disseminate the creative 
work was limited.  The separation result is also undercut by the 
possibility of bankruptcy.  If the value of the film is affected by the 
choice of the means of financing, then the ability to finance the 
project will affect the ability to produce the work.  Therefore, the 
separation result will not apply to the creation of intellectual prop-
erty. 
The failure of the Fisher Separation Theorem to apply has 
striking implications for both intellectual property law and the law 
of secured credit.  Much of the discussion of intellectual property 
rights is viewed largely as a question of how to define rights within 
the intellectual property rights system itself; that is, determining 
whether the legal regime should protect the right to exclude or the 
right of access.  The answer to this question depends on how the 
law of secured credit allocates property rights between debtor and 
creditor and among creditors. 
CONCLUSION 
Intellectual property and secured credit are not irreconcilable—
even though the legal regime protecting copyright and trademark is 
in conflict with the legal regime protecting secured credit ar-
rangements.  The inconsistencies that exist regarding the allocation 
of property rights and the means by which property rights are pro-
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tected can be resolved only if we isolate those conflicts between 
the property rights regimes. 
Advocates of article 9 or bankruptcy law reform generally ig-
nore the effects that their reform will have on intellectual property 
because they address the issue solely from the perspective of the 
secured creditor or the debtor.  That approach is flawed because 
the success of any reform proposal will depend upon a full under-
standing of the intricate conflicts between intellectual property 
law, bankruptcy law, and secured credit law.  Accordingly, one’s 
attitudes toward article 9 and bankruptcy, as well as relevant re-
form proposals, hinge on whether one is an intellectual property 
optimist or an intellectual property pessimist. 
An optimist would advocate stronger protection of the rights of 
the intellectual property owner and less for creditors and licensees.  
A pessimist would advocate the opposite position, heralding a 
strong, coherent system, which includes (1) guidelines for perfect-
ing security interests, (2) clear rules for determining priority dis-
putes between assignees and secured creditors, and (3) greater 
property protection for licensees against licensors. 
Although the current system has much to encourage and much 
to upset optimists and pessimists alike, this analysis of both view-
points suggests that the optimist perspective will generate the most 
effective reform proposals to reconcile the law of intellectual prop-
erty with the law of secured credit. 
